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ABSTRACT
The present study is an attempt to analyze in a comparative perspective Turgut 
Özal's and Siileyman Demirel's presidencies, which together make up the post-1989 
civilian experience with the presidency under the Constitution o f 1982. A particular 
reference is made to the conceptions o f the office in those presidents. Assessment is 
based on an evaluation o f the constitutional position o f the presidency vis-à-vis the 
Council o f Ministers, on the one hand, and the other actors concerned in the political 
process, on the other, under that constitution. For a better understanding, however, it is 
endeavored to determine where the Turkish system o f government stands along the 
presidential-parliamentary government continuum.
The work essentially argues that the differences between Turgut Özal's and 
Siileyman Demirel's conceptions of the presidency is predicated upon the difference 
between the former's belief in the need to transform the system of government from the 
existing predominantly parliamentary to a presidential one (systemic transformation) on 
the one hand, and the latter's belief in the virtues of the present parliamentary system that 
the needed change must be limited to revising that system within itself ( intra-systemic 
revision).
iü
ÖZET
Mevcut çalışma, 1982 Anayasası'nın yürürlükte olduğu 1989-sonrası dönemde, 
Turgut Özal ve Süleyman Demirel ile ortaya çıkan Cumhurbaşkanlığı'ndaki sivil 
tecrübeyi karşılaştırmalı olarak anlatmaktadır. Vurgulama noktası, bu 
Cumhurbaşkanlan'mn, anılan makam ile ilgili anlayışlarındadır. Değerlendirme, bu 
Cumhurbaşkanları'nın, Bakanlar Kurulu ve siyasi sürecin diğer aktörleri ile ilişkilerinde, 
makamlarının anayasal pozisyonuna göre yapılmaktadır. Anlatımın ve kavrayışın 
kolaylaşması için, 1982 Anayasası'nda düzenlenen hükümet sisteminin, başkanlık ve 
parlementer sistemler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, nereye oturtulabileceği tesbit 
edilmeye çalışılmaktadır.
Çalışma, özünde, Turgut Özal ve Süleyman Demirel'in Cumhurbaşkanlığı 
anlayışları arasındaki farklılığın temelinde; birincinin, mevcut önemli ölçüde parlementer 
hükümet sisteminden başkanlık sistemine doğru bir köklü dönüşüm yapılması ihtiyacına 
inancı (sistemsel dönüşüm) ile, İkincinin o sistemin erdemlerine güveni ve gerekli 
değişimi anılan sistemin kendi içinde sınırlaması (sistemsel revizyon) farkının olduğunu 
savunmaktadır.
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INTRODUCTION
The founders of the Republic of Turkey adopted a parliamentary form of 
government within the context of installing a democratic and secular nation-state. Since 
then, parliamentarism survived in Turkey with certain modifications in the content and 
nature of successive constitutions. In each case, pragmatism  played a major role; new 
conditions and the deficiencies o f the preceding constitutions were taken into 
consideration.
The framers o f the 1982 Constitution, continuing on the same understanding o f 
flexibility, exerted their energy to, among others, strengthen the hand o f the President 
o f the Republic ( l)  and the Council o f Ministers, which they ruled, would share the 
executive pow er and function. This was mainly a reaction to the perceived inability o f 
the preceding 1961 Constitution to create a properly functioning executive branch.
Under the new Constitution the new president's hand was strengthened mostly 
vis-à-vis the state-centered domain through his initiating role in the National Security 
Council, and in cases o f the state of emergency, in the Council of Ministers.
The first experience in this regard in the post-1980 era has been Kenan Evren's 
presidency, with continual statist overtones, and with a gradual transfer o f tasks of a 
predominantly political nature to the Council o f Ministers - the real political executive. 
(Heper, 1990: 309-316; see chapter 4)
Evren was succeeded by two civilian-origined presidents, Turgut Ozal and
1
Suleyman Demirel, respectively, both being elevated to the office from the ranks o f 
politicians; either was the leader o f the party which controlled the majority or plurality 
o f the seats in parliament, and was the Prime Minister on the eve o f the election to the 
post.
The present work is aimed to analyze the post-1989 civilian experience with the 
office o f the presidency, as framed by the prevailing Constitution o f 1982. More 
specifically, an attempt is made here at exploring the theoretical and practical web o f 
relations between the two heads o f the executive agency, as regulated by the said 
constitution and, in the same manner, at elaborating on the ways in which the two latest 
presidents, Turgut Ôzal (1989-1993) and Siileyman Demirel (1993-?), conceived o f the 
post they occupied.
The first chapter is devoted to an analysis o f the constitutional position o f the 
executive in general, and o f the presidency in particular, according to the 1982 
Constitution. For a concise understanding, the position of a president is taken up 
variously in the presidential parliamentary and, semi-presidential systems o f 
government, with practical as well as theoretical references to those systems.
The next two chapters deal with how Ôzal and Demirel, respectively, perceived 
o f the powers bestowed upon them as president and, acted accordingly.
The final chapter briefly assesses and compares the two presidencies, with 
special reference to the conceptions o f the presidency discernible in those presidents. 
The basic argument in the present work is that their conceptions differed widely due to 
the difference in the roles they liked to play and in the ultimate targets they desired to 
reach. This, in turn, rested on a difference in the diagnosis of the ills o f the country, 
which, according to Ôzal, necessitated an immediate and comprehensive systemic
2
transformation, to be engineered and pioneered by himself, but which, according to 
Demirel, could be overcome through continual and incremental systemic revision to be 
effected jointly by all authorities concerned.
The work is preliminary and, to a great extent, based on primary sources. It is 
preliminary, because only little time has passed over Ozal's presidency, and that of 
Demirel pending (the analysis o f Demirel presidency is restricted to a one-year period 
starting from 16 May 1993). The data used throughout the study are collected mainly 
from newspapers; an attempt is made to retain the original statements o f the two 
Presidents, the Prime Ministers, and all others concerned.
3
NOTES
(1) The Turkish head of state is officially called the 'President o f the Republic' 
(' Cutnhıırbaşkanl), as Turkey is a republic. That officeholder is henceforth referred to 
as the 'President'.
(2) The present work largely draws, besides a number of scientific works, upon 
a number o f a thorough survey o f M illiyet, an Istanbul daily, from 1 January 1988 to 31 
May 1994. Some selected issues of other Istanbul dailies, most notably Sabah, Hürriyet 
and Cumhuriyet, o f an Istanbul weekly, Nokta, are also used.
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CHAPTER I
THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND 
THE STATUS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC UNDER THE 1982
CONSTITUTION
The office o f the president has always been subject to controversy in Turkey. 
Such controversy culminated in the 1961-80 era, in which elections to the post led to 
a kind of ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Özdemir, 1989:9) (1). The inability o f successive 
governments to amend the provisions relating to the presidential election, and, in 
particular, the failure to elect a new president in 1980, pushed the makers of the 
intervention of 12 September 1980 to take a closer look at the office.
Special attention had to be paid to the post also because o f the intentions o f the 
intervening generals. Their main goal was to establish all mechanisms necessary to 
ensure the orderly and harmonious functioning of the system so as not to feel compelled 
to intervene once again (Heper, 1987:56). Put in simpler words, the generals hoped and 
wished that the ‘ 12 September event’ be the last instance o f its kind. The strengthening 
within the state structure o f the executive branch in general and, o f the office o f the 
president in particular, while remaining loyal to the spirit o f parliamentary government, 
the generals reasoned, would constitute an important and inevitable step on course.
As the present work attempts to compare and contrast the presidencies o f the 
two latest presidents, Turgut Özal and Siileyman Demirel, with particular emphasis on 
their styles and conceptions of the post, it seems useful first to draw the constitutional
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framework within which to do so. This, in turn, necessitates an elaboration o f the 
presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems o f government, each being a 
structural kind of representative democracy that is aimed to create limited government 
(2), with a view to the status o f the president in each system.
1.1 The Office o f the Presidency in the Three Systems o f Government
From the viewpoint o f the structures of their executives, representative 
democracies may be categorized into two: the inonist ones with executive authority 
lying with one organ, a single person or council, and the dualistic ones with such 
authority being shared between a person and a council. (3) The first type o f the monist 
executive is seen in the presidential system, in which the president uses the executive 
authority on behalf o f the electorate with the help o f his own secretaries and advisers. 
The president, both as the head of state and as the head of the executive, is the only 
source of the executive authority. The other type of such executive, on the other hand, 
is characteristic of the Swiss system o f government, according to which a college (the 
Federal Council in Switzerland ) uses the executive power collectively. No office of 
the head o f the system exists in a collegial executive system .
As for the dualistic executive, it is associated with the parliamentary system of 
government. Although the head o f state is granted some portion o f the executive 
authority (both in a constitutional monarchy and in a republic), he is assumed to be 
politically irresponsible. Responsibility to parliament lies with the Council of Ministers, 
collectively, and with its members, individually. In a plainly parliamentary system the 
head of state is no more than a figurehead, with only symbolic and ceremonial powers ; 
the Council of Ministers has supremacy. The furthest deviation from his rule has been 
evinced in France with the 1958 Constitution, which created the Fifth Republic in that
6
country.
1.1.1 The President in the Presidential Executive
As already noted, presidential ism is a system o f government, in which the 
president is the sole source o f the executive power. The system, thus, by definition, 
gives the president vital, central place among public institutions at the national level. 
(Neustadt, 1968: 451) (4)
Morgon and Connor (1979: 228) have identified four constituencies o f a US 
president: The ‘government’ constituency (he is the chief executive), the ‘partisan’ 
constituency (he is the leader o f his party), the ‘national’ constituency (he personifies 
the American nation), and, the ‘overseas’ constituency (he serves as the principal organ 
in foreign affairs). Bell (1967: 10), likewise, draws attention to seven roles for the US 
president:
The ceremonial chief of state, head of executive department, 
commander in chief of the armed forces, principal diplomat, chief 
magistrate for enforcement of laws, and dispenser o f pardons.
The supreme position of the American President is a product o f constitutional 
provision on the one hand and, o f precedents and modem practice on the other 
(Neustadt, 1968: 451-452). The Constitution provides the President with five principal 
positions o f advantage in the governmental system. First, he enjoys security o f tenure 
for a four-year period, with removal only by congressional impeachment - a 
cumbersome procedure. Second is the indirect popular election through the medium of 
electoral college. Office-holding through popular election legitimates the President’s 
supreme position. Third, he is in command of the armed forces and the conduct of
7
diplomacy. Fourth, he enjoys specific rights and duties bearing on the conduct o f public 
administration, most important of which is the right to name department heads and, the 
duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’. Fifth, he is equipped with a 
limited y e t crucial prerogative in legislation: the qualified veto power and the right to 
recommend.
A long accretion o f precedents resulting from personalities in office has also 
enlarged the presidency, increasing its position o f  advantage relative to other 
institutions in the system, and thus adding further to its constitutional advantages. The 
width o f the scope o f the powers o f the US presidency thus resulted in part from 
transfer o f prerogatives from congress, i.e. by means o f ‘delegation o f  pow ers 
(Burdeau, 1968). The combination o f constitutional and precedential positions o f 
advantage make the office all the more indispensable to the effective performance o f 
all other governmental institutions.
The 1787 Constitution not only established the foundations for this office, but 
also ruled that its positions of advantage should be matched by those o f other national 
institutions, notably the Congress. This is the application o f the principle of ‘separated 
powers’, according to which separated institutions share powers. Congressional 
positions o f advantage confront, check, and balance a president’s advantages. The 
separation o f congress and presidency, on the one hand, and the checks and balances 
mechanisms between them, on the other are corollary to the rigid  application o f the 
theory o f separation of powers (Turhan, 1989: 32), supplemented by the means o f 
balancing those powers o f the governmental institutions. The purpose inherent in such 
regulations is to avoid arbitrary intrusion o f one institution into the domain o f rule o f 
another, and therefore to ensure freedom, as theorized by Montesquieu.
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The Constitution granted one or both houses o f the Congress, the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, a share in every aspect o f the presidency’s powers although it 
did not make the president politically responsible to the Congress for his actions. The 
powers reserved to the president include proposing laws to the Congress, issuing 
degrees having force o f law, appointing federal judges, and dispensing pardons. On the 
other hand, however, the conduct of defense was qualified by making force levels and 
funds on congressional enactment and by reserving to the Congress the right to declare 
war; the conduct o f diplomacy was qualified by granting to the senate the right to give 
its ‘advice and consent’ on treaties; the conduct o f administration was restricted by 
making money, authority and departmental structure subject to specific legislation - 
with presidential appointees subject to senate confirmation and in the sphere o f 
legislation, congress was paramount, checked only by presidential veto, which itself 
was subject to an overriding two-thirds vote of the two houses. A further advantage o f 
Congress is that o f fixed tenure-six years for the senators and two years for the 
representatives, both being different in length from the chief executive. This, however, 
may also result in political deadlocks when the president and the majority of congress 
belong to different parties. A final principal advantage enjoyed by the congressmen is 
their popular election no less direct than the presidents. This popularity of election 
strengthens their hands in claiming countervailing powers. (Neutadt, 1968)
What follows are rigidly separated executive and legislative agencies that check 
and balance one another. They are politically mutually independent and irresponsible; 
responsibility is due only to the electorate . The cabinet, members of which are 
appointed by the president from outside the congress and are responsible to him only, 
are free of congressional pressure to quit office. In exchange the congress is free o f 
presidential dissolution. In other words, the president lacks the power to dissolve the
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congress in case o f a disagreement on a central issue, and the congressmen, in 
exchange, cannot hold governmental office so long as they occupy legislative posts.
The US system o f government, therefore, suggests two traits for our purposes. 
First an elective president who serves as the chief o f state and the chief o f government 
simultaneously is central to the system; he is the key figure in policy making. His 
cabinet is responsible to him. Second is the separateness o f an elective legislature that 
engages in law-making. As such, presidentialism contrasts sharply with the 
parliamentary government.
1.1.2 The President in the Parliamentary Executive
Britain was the cradle o f parliamentary democracy, and thus its system provided 
an example for a great many other countries. As such, the British system has commonly 
and customarily been called parliamentarism.
Parliamentarism, however, have also taken different forms in continental 
Europe. It is beyond purpose here to distinguish its various forms. Below, an attempt is 
made to identify the factors common to parliamentary systems.
The parliamentary system o f government is evolutionary in nature; it is the 
result o f a process by which representative assemblies successfully challenged 
monarchies in the course o f modem history. The purpose has been to ensure 
parliamentary supremacy over the monarch, the sole executive of the time (Epstein, 
1968: 420). The system over time took on the form of constitutional democracy in 
which the executive authority emerged from, and was responsible to, legislative 
authority. Although it is generally the case that the executive prepares laws and the 
legislature enacts (or rejects) them, the two agencies are expected to cooperate in one
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way or another.
The executive agency has two heads, both emerging from the legislature. In a 
republican order, the president is the head/chief o f state and is equipped with rather 
symbolic powers. His role is limited to controlling the balance between the executive 
and legislative agencies, representing the continuity o f state and national unity and 
arbitrating when necessary. As such, he is non-partisan and impartial. He represents the 
politically //responsible wing o f the executive organ. The actions which he undertakes 
requires approval by the Prime Minister and the minister(s) concerned. This is the rule 
or principle of counter-signature, the rationale behind which is to find responsibility for 
presidential acts (Turhan, 1989: 51-52).
The essential union of the executive and legislative branches is accompanied by 
the constitutional principle that the legislature (called parliament) is supreme. The 
principal executive, the prime minister, is appointed by the president. The prime 
minister, in turn, chooses the executive heads o f government departments, the 
ministers. Both the prime minister and his cabinet, known together as the council o f 
ministers or government, are normally expected to be members o f parliament (5). They 
hold ministerial office only so long as they have majority support in parliament. The 
rule o f continuous legislative confidence is regularly demonstrated in government’s 
submission of its program and record for parliamentary approval. A defeat for the 
government through an adverse legislative vote on a plainly important issue indicates a 
lack o f confidence requiring the government either to resign or attempt, by means o f a 
general election, to secure a new parliamentary majority. A government can stay in 
office only temporarily if it fails to enjoy parliamentary support for its policies. Unlike 
in the presidential government, ‘fsjtalemate between an executive o f one persuasion 
and, a legislature o f another... is meant to be impossible in the parliamentary system’
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(Epstein, 1968: 419-420). Instability o f the executive authority, on the other hand, is 
quite possible. Executive’s effectiveness in policy making is possible only when a 
strong partisan supportive majority develops in parliament.
The parliamentary government, therefore, suggests a number o f traits for our 
purposes. First is the union o f the executive and legislative agencies and, the former’s 
need for the latter’s continuous confidence and support. The former normally emerges 
from and is responsible to the latter. This is the flexible separation o f powers. Second is 
the theoretical supremacy of parliament and actual centrality o f cabinet and, notably, 
o f the prime minister, the chief executive with political responsibility to the electorate 
and its legislative representatives. Third is the presence o f a politically irresponsible, 
impartial president (in a republican order), who is the chief o f state and shares 
executive power so long as his exercise of such powers is approved by the politically 
responsible wing o f the executive, the prime minister and the ministers) concerned.
Douglas V. Vemey’s (1992:31-47) ‘eleven propositions’ which he developed in 
an attempt to contrast the presidential and parliamentary governments may be useful 
for purposes of summarizing what has so far be taken up. Vemey notes that in a 
parliamentary system, theoretically speaking, ‘[t]he assembly becomes a parliament’; 
‘[t]he executive is divided into two parts’; ‘[t]he head o f state appoints the head of 
government’; tt]he head of government appoints the ministry', ‘[t]he ministry (or 
government) is a collective body’, ‘[ministers are usually members of parliament’; 
‘[t]he government is politically responsible to the assembly’; ‘[t]he head of government 
may advise the head o f state to dissolve the parliament’; '[parliament as a whole is 
supreme over its constituent parts, government and assembly, neither of which 
dominate the other'; ‘[parliament as a whole is only indirectly responsible to the 
electorate’; and ‘[parliament is the focus o f the power in the political system’. In
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presidential government, by contrast, ‘[t]he assembly remains an assembly’ (e.g. the 
Congress in the US); ‘[t]he executive is not divided but is a president elected by the 
people for a definite term at the time of assembly elections’; ‘[t]he head o f the 
government is the head o f  state’; ‘[t]he president appoints heads o f departments who 
are his subordinates’; ‘[t]he president is sole executive’; ‘[mjembers o f the assembly 
are not eligible for office in the administration and vice versa’; ‘[t]he executive is 
responsible to the constitution’, ‘[t]he president cannot dissolve or coerce the 
assembly’; ‘[t]he assembly is ultimately supreme over other branches o f government 
and there is no fusion o f  the executive and legislative branches as in a parliament’; 
‘[t]he executive is directly responsible to the electorate’; and ‘[t]here is no focus o f 
power in the political system’. (18)
1.1.3 The President in the Semi-Presidential Executive
Semi-presidentialism, by definition, is hybrid  in nature and characterizes the 
Fifth French Republic established by the 1958 Constitution. The office o f the president 
in this system is weaker than the one in US but stronger than the one in any 
parliamentary government.
Three elements combine to create a semi-presidential government (Duverger, 
1980: 165). First the president is elected by general vote and practically on a partisan 
ticket. The direct popular election o f the president for a term of office o f seven years 
was effected through a constitutional amendment in 1962. The amendment was 
necessary in order to strengthen the upper hand of the president. Under the provisions 
of the 1958 Constitution, in the manner, the president was selected by a special 
electoral college (article 6). Therefore, ’[t]he government, which was dependent on the 
National Assembly, which, in turn, was elected by direct universal suffrage, remained
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closer to democratic legitimacy' (Duverger, 1980). With the 1962 amendment, 
however,
...the President [became] the only official, elected by direct 
universal suffrage of the entire country. In this sense, he 
enjoy[ed] a democratic legitimacy, much more direct than that 
o f the Prime Minister and the government. The latter [did] not 
depend directly on popular vote, but [did] so only indirectly 
through the confidence conferred upon them by the National 
Assembly, itself elected by the people. Thus the constitutional 
amendment o f 1962 put the President on an equal footing, as far 
as democratic legitimacy [was] concerned , with the National 
Assembly, and above the government. Thereby, it introduced an 
element o f presidentialism into the previous essentially 
parliamentary system, transforming it into a genuine mixed 
regime, half parliamentary, half-presidential. (Ôzbudun, 1988:
44; also see Ôzbudun, 1993: 304-305 )
The second element of semi-presidentialism is the enlargement o f the 
presidency, particularly following the said supplementary amendment. He is the 
guardian o f the Constitution; is entrusted with providing the orderly functioning o f 
public power through his arbitration, as well as with preserving the continuity o f the 
state; and is the chief defender of national independence and territorial integrity (article 
5). He can freely exercise such powers as appointing the Prime Minister and accepting 
his resignation, submitting laws to referenda, dissolving the National Assembly, 
sending to the Constitutional Council those laws and international treaties which he 
deemed contrary to the Constitution, appointing three o f the nine members o f the 
Constitutional Council and its president from among the members, and taking measures 
necessary for his emergency powers in accordance with article 16 (article 19) which 
reads as follows:
Should the institutions o f the Republic, the independence of the 
nation, the integrity o f the territory or, the fulfillment of 
international commitments be threatened in a grave and
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immediate manner, and the regular functioning o f the 
constitutional governmental authorities be interrupted, the 
President shall take the measures commanded by these 
circumstances, after official consultation with the Premier, the 
Presidents o f the Assemblies and the Constitutional Council. He 
shall inform the nation o f these measures in a message. These 
measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure to the 
constitutional governmental authorities, in the shortest possible 
time, the means o f fulfilling their assigned functions. The 
Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such 
measures. Parliament shall meet by right. The National 
Assembly cannot be dissolved during the exercise o f emergency 
powers.
The quoted article expressly states that the President might 'alone determine 
whether the conditions pose[d] a threat "grave and immediate" enough to justify the 
proclamation o f a state o f emergency, and again determine the measures to be taken to 
cope with the emergency'. The sole practical limitation upon the emergency powers o f 
the President is his lack o f authority to dissolve the Parliament as long as such state o f 
affairs continues. (Ozbudun, 1988: 41)
As he normally chairs the Council of Ministers (article 9), the French President 
also participates actively in the decision making. It is he who names the ministers, who 
has his own staff, and who can set new elections whenever he chooses after the 
completion o f the first year o f the legislature's term. All these powers are kept out o f 
the principle o f counter-signature, and constitutes an area where the president is 
empowered to act alone.
The two elements o f semi-presidentialism that have so far been taken up are the 
presidential dimensions, representing the system's deviation from parliamentarism. The 
third and final element, however, is a parliamentary legacy in the Fifth French 
Republic: The French Prime Minister and his fellow Ministers enjoy executive powers
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as long as they entertain continuous parliamentary confidence. The Council o f Ministers 
emerges from and, is collectively responsible to, the legislature. The Prime Minister, as 
requisite o f the dualistic executive structure remains the chief executive and, primarily 
responsible to Parliament; the ministers are neither secretaries nor counselors o f the 
President; the President is supreme, but neither the sole nor the chief executive (e.g., he 
cannot dismiss a government at will).
The French system as such is characterized as 'weakened parliamentarism'. It is 
also a reflection o f a rigid separation o f the executive and legislative agencies (though 
not as rigid as in the US).
All in all, the nature o f the relations between the President and the Council o f 
Ministers (and also the Parliament) varies in relation to whether there existed a one- 
party majority in Parliament, whether the President is a member o f the majority party, 
and whether he is the leader o f such party. If the President enjoys all the three 
conditions positively, the system is expected to shift more to presidentialism. If, 
however, the parliamentary seats are distributed among several parties, the president is 
likely to strengthen his political position. If, on the other hand, no one or more parties 
enjoy a majority and the President is not a member or leader o f any of them, the system 
is likely to become more parliamentary. Put in simpler words, the President's exercise 
o f  the powers reserved to him  varies in relation to the nature o fh is  relationship with the 
parliamentary majority; he is strong only i f  he is able to lead that majority, and weak 
(symbolic), i f  otherwise (Duverger, 1980; Ozbudun, 1993: 307).
1.2 The Executive and the Status o f the President under the Turkish 
Constitution o f 1982
As already noted, the 12 September 1980 intervenors, not unlike their
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predecessors, exerted efforts to restructure the political system so that no necessity 
should be felt to intervene once again and, thought that the strengthening o f  the 
executive and, within it, o f the presidency, was a safety valve to this end. They did not, 
therefore, hide their intention to create a strong executive. They had come to identify 
the pre-1980 ills with, among others, the weaknesses o f the executive resulting from the 
then reigning 1961 Constitution. The solution then was to create a strong executive; 
responsible as well as responsive governments could cope with the country's problems 
and, when they failed to do so, the President, as the ultimate guardian of the state, 
would appear in the picture and intervene with his (reserve) powers.
Orhan Aldikaçti, the chairman o f the Constitutional Commission which 
prepared the 1982 Constitution, forwarded his diagnosis of the problem with the 1961 
Constitution as follows:
When the 1961 Constitution was [framed], the executive organ 
was [shaped] as one which belonged to the legislative organ, 
which could not [exceed] the framework o f the laws [enacted] 
by the legislative organ. [Such] belongingness was for sure 
decreasing the executive's capacity to initiate, and [the latter] 
was waiting for the law which the legislative assembly was to 
enact, for every [act] it was to undertake . (quoted, Turhan,
1989: 94)
General Kenan Evren, the head o f the junta that ruled the country in the 
interregnum of 1980-1983, underlined the very same point and explained the junta's 
solution.
That the executive which carried the whole lead of the State and 
the everyday life was, despite... all its vital significance, pushed 
to the back and [was made] unworkable, constituted probably 
the biggest drawback... o f the 1961 Constitution... As long as 
the executive... was left [to] that understanding, the State could 
not [be saved from] being [like] a man with one leg absent and 
walked with a stick. Now, the [new] constitution which is
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being presented to [popular] acceptance and approval has been 
built to overcome this defect as regards the structure and 
facilities o f the State. Choosing such a way is compulsory, a 
must and, its result will be well-targeted, (quoted, Ozbudun, 
1993: 39)
Evren also depicted what they intended to do and how. He added,
...that the president, who is both the head o f the State and the 
head o f the executive, will definitely be impartial... towards the 
political parties [and] their coalitions is a requirement o f the 
regime [read, the political system]... If the idea and the 
indispensability o f the strengthening o f the executive is 
accepted by everyone, and [if] the presidency and the 
government are at the zenith of the executive, which o f these 
[two] is meant to be strengthened? Should both be strengthened 
simultaneously, or the impartial president, or the partisan 
government alone? Some powers are granted to the partisan 
government. However, the powers, which may give way to 
serious disputes and troubles between the government and the 
opposition have been granted to the president. Apart from them, 
there are also those powers, which had definitely to be granted 
to the president; it is neither correct nor possible to grant them 
to some other office, (quoted, ibid.: 39-40)
It was no surprise then that the new constitution emphasized 'executive 
authority'. The executive was no longer defined in terms o f 'function' or ’duty’ only, as 
in the 1961 Constitution, but also o f 'pow et. The new Constitution read 'Executive 
power and function shall be exercised and carried out by the President and the Council 
o f Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and the laws' (article 8).
The strengthening of the president's position in particular, and, o f the executive 
branch, in general, denotes a paradoxical novelty. On the one hand, the creation o f a 
stronger president is a deviation from parliamentarism. On the other hand, however, the 
executive and the legislative agencies have been re-defined on the basis o f the principle 
o f equality and in a way to ensure their cooperation. (Turhan, 1989:93-101)
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1.2.1 The Constitutional Position o f the Turkish President
The logic behind the uneasy formula of strengthening the President while at the 
same time remaining loyal to the spirit o f parliamentary government has been explained 
by Aldikaçti.
...[the] statutes of the president and the Prime Minister have 
been regulated separately. The principle o f presidential 
[political] irresponsibility has been adopted in conformity with 
the spirit o f the parliamentary regime, and the president has 
been given the power o f unilateral signature where 
responsibility is not a matter, (quoted, Turhan, 1989:119)
An elaboration o f this intention and, the place o f the presidency within the 
broader system o f government under the said constitution, requires an enlistment and 
analysis o f the provisions in that constitution that relate to the office in one way or 
another.
As noted above, the President is empowered to share the executive 'power' and 
'duty' with the Council of Ministers. It is also illustrative in this regard that the second 
chapter o f the constitution, which relates to the executive, starts with the presidency. In 
his oath, the president swears
to safeguard the existence and independence o f the State, the 
indivisible integrity of the country and the nation and, the 
absolute sovereignty o f the nation; to abide by the constitution, 
the rule o f law, democracy, the principles and reforms of 
Atatürk and the principles of the secular republic; not to deviate 
from the ideal according to which everyone is entitled to enjoy 
human rights and fundamental freedoms under conditions of 
national peace and prosperity and in a spirit of national 
solidarity and justice and; to do [his] utmost to preserve and 
exalt the glory and honor of the Republic o f Turkey and 
perform in an impartial manner the functions that [he has] 
assumed, (article 103).
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The powers, which the president may exercise (taken up below) should be seen 
in this light.
Election o f  the President. As a student of Turkish politics (Özdemir, 1989: 36) 
has noted, 'one o f the expectations from the commission entrusted with preparing the 
Constitution o f 1982' was the creation of'new  mechanisms that facilitate the election o f 
the president’. The deadlock in parliament resulting from the inability to choose a 
president in more than six months in 1980 was still fresh in memories.
As the demand for the popular election o f the president of some members o f the 
Consultative Assembly proved to be vein, solutions were sought within the present 
method o f election, i.e. election by, and expectedly out of, the National Assembly; 
differing ideas were also voiced about whether the presidential candidate should have 
never been a member o f a political party as a member o f parliament or otherwise. A 
member of the Consultative Assembly ( Şükrü Başbuğ) was in favor o f the election of 
a president who has never engaged officially in a political party affair, while another ( 
Cahit Tutum) advocated the election o f a deputy as the president. In the end, it was 
decided that both ways should be possible. (Özdemir, 1989:36)
To be qualified for election as the president, the candidate must be at least forty 
years o f age, be a member o f Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) - or be 
eligible to be a deputy - and have received higher (i.e., university-level) education. A 
group o f deputies not less than one-fifth o f the full membership o f the 450-member, 
unicameral Assembly may nominate a person for the president from outside the 
Assembly. The president is elected for a term of seven years, and re-election is not 
possible. The president-elect, if a member of a political party, is required to resign from 
his party; his membership in the Assembly is terminated upon his election, (article 101)
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The president's election for a term of seven years does not overlap the 
parliament's election, which, in theory, is theoretically for a term o f five years. This 
regulation is aimed to consolidate the presidential impartiality, because the existence o f 
two different terms o f office implies that a president emanating from the leadership o f a 
given political party may later work with a parliamentary majority o f one or more 
parties other than his former one, thus decreasing his identification of himself with the 
latter party. The rule o f no re-election, likewise, is designed to prevent any possible 
moves by the president to engage in affairs that suit best for one or more given political 
parties.
The parliamentary election o f the president also serves to create an above-party 
president. As Ergun Ôzbudun (1993: 280) aptly put,
the president who is indeed equipped with strong powers 
[according to] the constitution could have easily become the 
supreme element o f the political system if  [he could have also 
enjoyed] the moral authority granted by election directly 
through popular vote... and such a system could have taken on 
the quality o f a type o f presidential or semi-presidential regime.
A two-thirds majority o f the full membership o f the TGNA is sought on the first 
two ballots of the presidential election. If  such a majority cannot be obtained, an 
absolute majority o f the fiill membership will suffice on the third ballot. If this majority 
also cannot be obtained, a fourth (last) ballot will be held between the two candidates 
who received the highest number o f votes on the third ballot. If this last ballot fails to 
produce a president with an absolute majority, the Assembly dissolves itself 
automatically to hold new general elections immediately, (article 102) The provisions 
relating to the fourth ballot and the automatic dissolution of the assembly -novelties 
introduced by the 1982 constitution (Ôzbudun, 1988: 38) - are aimed to prevent the 
deadlocks characteristic o f the 1961-80 period.
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Such a regulation may work in both ways. On the one hand, it, by seeking a 
qualified majority on the first two ballots, may produce a president through an inter­
party compromise - one who is acceptable to more than one party. On the other hand, 
however, the regulation may result in the election o f a member (expectedly, the leader) 
o f a given political party as the president provided that that party controls at least 226 
parliamentary seats and not suffers intra-party disputes over the candidate. The novelty 
o f automatic dissolution o f the Assembly, however, decreases the probability o f such 
intra-party disputes.
The Powers, Responsibilities and Duties o f  the President The president in his 
capacity as the head o f the state is given the duty to 'represent the Republic o f Turkey 
and the unity o f the Turkish nation... [and to] oversee the implementation o f the 
constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning o f the organs o f the state'. To 
this end, he is assigned a number o f duties and powers pertaining to all three branches 
o f government, (article 104)
His powers relating to the legislative functions include: delivering, if he deems 
it necessary the inaugural address at the beginning o f each legislative year; summoning 
the TGNA into session, when he deems it necessary; promulgating laws; returning laws 
to the Assembly for reconsideration; submitting proposed constitutional amendments to 
popular referendum; appealing to the Constitutional Court for the annulment o f laws, 
decrees having force of law, and the Standing Orders of the Assembly on grounds of 
unconditionality; and dissolving the Assembly and calling for new elections.
The presidential powers pertaining to the executive function are: appointing the 
Prime Minister and accepting his resignation; appointing or dismissing other ministers 
as proposed by the Prime Minister; presiding over the meetings of the Council of
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Ministers, whenever he deems it necessary; accrediting Turkish diplomatic 
representatives to foreign states and receiving the diplomatic representatives o f foreign 
states; ratifying and promulgating international treaties; representing the office o f the 
commander-in-chief o f the Turkish armed forces on behalf o f the TGNA; mobilizing 
the armed forces; appointing the Chief o f the General Staff; calling the meetings o f the 
National Security Council and presiding over it; proclaiming martial law or a state o f 
emergency in collaboration with the Council o f Ministers; signing governmental 
decrees; pardoning the sentences of certain individuals on account o f illness, disability, 
or old age; appointing the chairman and members of the State Supervisory Council, and 
instructing it to carry out investigations and inspections; appointing the members o f the 
Board o f Higher Education; and appointing university rectors.
As for the president's powers with regard to the judicial function, they include 
appointing the members o f the Constitutional Court, one-fourth o f the members o f the 
Council o f State, the Chief Prosecutor o f the Court of Cassation and his deputy, the 
members o f Military Court o f Cassation, the members o f the High Military 
Administrative Court, and the members o f the Supreme Council o f Judges and 
Prosecutors.
What this list o f powers suggests is that the 1982 Constitution, in comparison to 
the preceding 1961 Constitution, created a stronger presidential office. He is 
empowered to intervene as an overseer in the state apparatus in one way or another in 
an attempt to ensure its proper functioning. The Turkish system of government under 
the reigning constitution is no longer plainly parliamentary; yet, it is not semi- 
presidential, either.
The provisions relating to the political responsibility are illustrative in this
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regard. The article concerned (article 105) reads as follows:
All decisions of the President, except those stated in the 
Constitution and relevant laws that he may undertake 
unilaterally without need for [counter-Jsignature by the Prime 
Minister [and] the Ministers concerned, shall be signed by the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned; the Prime 
Ministers and the Ministers concerned are responsible for these 
decisions.
No application is possible to be made to judiciat authorities 
including the Constitutional Court for those decisions and orders which the 
President signs on his own initiative.
The system is no longer plainly parliamentary because the president does not 
need counter-signature when, for instance, he summons the Assembly into session 
during recess (when he deems it necessary); dissolves parliament when the conditions 
in Article 116 exist; appeals to the Constitutional Court for the annulment o f laws, 
decrees having force of law and the Standing Orders o f the Assembly on grounds o f 
unconditionality or; submits to a referendum legislation regarding the amendment o f 
the Constitution. He exercises all these powers as the chief o f the state, and not as the 
chief o f the executive; yet, neither is symbolic nor ceremonial.
The present governmental system is not semi-presidential, either. No express 
specification o f situations, in which the president can enjoy unilateral powers, is given 
in the Constitution. Rather, the president exercises most governmental powers jointly 
with the Council o f Ministers at large and the Prime Minister in particular. The 
instances in point include the appointments of the Chief of the General Staff (upon the 
nomination o f the Council of Ministers), the ratification and promulgation o f 
international treaties and, the accrediting of Turkish diplomatic representatives to 
foreign countries. His appointive powers, on the other hand, may be used only after the
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candidates are nominated by some other body.
A further difference between the semi-presidential and the (1982) Turkish 
systems in this regard may be found in their regulations regarding the emergency 
powers o f the president. As stated above, the French President is granted virtually 
dictatorial powers o f emergency only except dissolving the National Assembly. The 
Turkish President, by contrast, only chairs the Council o f Ministers before the latter 
could proclaim martial law or a state o f emergency and later submit their proclamation 
to the TGNA for approval. However, unlike the discretionary emergency powers o f the 
French President, the Turkish President is only expected to chair the Council o f 
Ministers for the latter to issue decrees having force o f law which are also subject to 
regulation by law. Thus, the emergency situations in Turkey necessitate a cooperation 
between the President, the Council of Ministers, and the Assembly.
Before making an overall assessment of the executive within the system o f 
government introduced by the 12 September regime, and of the position o f the 
presidency within the former, it may be of use to deal with the politically responsible 
wing o f the executive - the Council of Ministers, as framed by the 1982 constitution.
1.2.2 The Council of Ministers under the 1982 Constitution
The Council o f Ministers is composed of the Prime Minister and a number o f 
Ministers. The President appoints the former from among the members of Parliament 
and he (the Prime Minister) chooses the latter from among the members of Parliament 
or those who are eligible to be so. The Ministers can be dismissed by the President upon 
the proposal of the Prime Minister, (article 109)
The Council o f Ministers must entertain a continuous legislative confidence and
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Support for effective government so as to stay in office, (article 111)
The Prime Minister, as Chairman o f the Council o f Ministers, is entrusted with 
ensuring cooperation among the Ministers, and supervising the implementation o f the 
government's general policy. The Ministers are collectively responsible for the 
implementation o f this policy. Each Minister is personally responsible to the Prime 
Minister and, individually responsible for the conduct o f affairs under his jurisdiction 
and for the acts and activities o f his subordinates (article 112); a vote o f no confidence 
or censure against the Council as a whole or against a given Minister suffices to remove 
the Council and that Minister, respectively.
The provisions stating that the Prime Minister may propose the President the 
dismissal o f any o f his Ministers (article 109) and that the Ministers are personally 
responsible to the Prime Minister strengthens the latter's hand in line with the notion o f 
rule o f  law  whereby authority goes hand in hand with responsibility.
In cases where the Council o f Ministers fails to receive a vote o f confidence, 
and a new Council o f Ministers cannot be formed within forty five days or, the Council 
o f Ministers fails to receive a vote o f confidence, the President, in consultation with the 
Speaker o f the TGNA, may call new elections, (article 116)
As already noted, the reigning Constitution maintains that the Council o f the 
Ministers and the Presidency collaborate in certain executive matters, whereby 
responsibility lies with the former. Corollary to such division o f labor, it is stated, is, 
for instance, the collaboration in the state of emergency (which the Constitution divided 
into three: natural disaster or serious economic crisis; widespread acts of violence and 
serious deterioration o f public order and; martial law, mobilization and state o f war) 
during which the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of the President
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may rule by decrees having force of law. The Constitution stipulates that all three types 
o f the state o f emergency are related to national security for which the Council of 
Ministers is responsible. As requisite o f this division o f labor, however, the President, 
in his capacity as the chief o f the state, is also given a part in decision making 
pertaining to national defense.
Related to national security is the National Security Council, which is composed 
of the President (chairman); the Prime Minister; the Chief o f the General Staff; the 
Ministers of National Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs; the Commanders o f the 
Army, Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander o f the Gendarmerie. It is 
entrusted with submitting to the Council o f Ministers its views and with ensuring the 
necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and 
implementation o f the national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers is 
asked to give 'priority consideration' to the decisions o f the National Security Council 
concerning the measures it deems necessary for the preservation o f the existence and 
independence o f the state, the integrity and indivisibility o f the country, and the peace 
and security o f society. It is the President's responsibility to draw up the agenda of the 
Council after taking into consideration the proposal o f the Prime Ministers and the 
Chief o f the General Staff, (article 118)
The Council must be consulted before declaring a state of emergency (article 
120) or martial law, mobilization and state o f war (article 122).
The National Security Council, in general and its head, the President in 
particular, therefore, constitute the statist arm in the executive. The former is designed 
to aid the latter in exercising reserve powers relating to internal unity and external 
security (law and order) as an overseer (Heper, 1990)
27
1.3 Evaluation
That the 'survival o f [Turkish] state and people’ had been under threat was the 
major explanation which General Evren gave for the military takeover o f 12 September 
1980. The 'aim' thereafter would be 'safeguarding the unity of the country and the 
nation..., ensuring the prevalence of law and order -in other words, restoring the state 
authority in an impartial manner'. (Ahmad, 1993:181)
In an attempt to prevent the recurrence o f what Ôzdemir (1989) calls 'state 
crisis', associated with the presidential elections in the 1961-80 epoch, they introduced 
novelties regarding the method of such election (the fourth ballot, and the automatic 
dissolution of the parliament). They maintained the legacy of the 1961 Constitution 
with regard to the impartiality and political irresponsibility of the presidency 
(representation o f the nation as whole, i.e. o f the general interest; parliamentary election 
for a single term o f seven years -as different from that o f parliament- on a non-partisan 
ticket, and with a two thirds majority; and the maintenance o f the principle o f counter- 
signature, though with certain flexibility).
Unlike the 1961 Constitution, however, the 1982 Constitution does not equate 
political impartiality and irresponsibility with figureheadship. The new President is 
given an active role in all the three branches o f government with routine or potential 
(reserve) powers, and appointive functions, which he is to use on his own initiative, 
with counter-signature or, jointly with other authorities. He is made the ultimate 
guardian o f the republic (the state), the protector o f internal unity and external security 
and an overseer o f the proper functioning of the state organs. As such, he is first and 
foremost the head o f the state.
The president is also the head of the executive. Such headship however is
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limited to matters that relate to the 'state', rather than to 'politics' - the latter being a 
matter o f the Council o f  Ministers, which holds the ultimate political responsibility. The 
President's participation in decision-making is temporary and symbolic ('when he 
deems it necessary'). Therefore, the presidential office which the 12 September regime 
created is a strong headship o f the state rather than that o f the executive. This is also 
evident in that the Prime Minister, the real head o f the executive, has also been 
strengthened (he is no longer primus inter pares).
The system o f  the government established by the reigning Constitution, in 
conclusion, is a pragmatic deviation from the classical parliamentary theory towards 
semi-presidential government. It needs to take many more miles towards 
presidentialism, if it ever does.
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NOTES
(1) This chapter mainly draws upon a synthetic exploration o f  a number o f 
works by Maurice Duverger (1980), Leon D. Epstein (1968), Metin Heper (1990), 
Richard E. Neustadt (1968), Ergun Ôzbudun (1993, and 1988), and Mehmet Turhan 
(1989).
(2) The idea o f limited government stems from the theory o f the separation o f 
powers, i.e. separation between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, each 
being distinctly organized and autonomous. Corollary to such separation are checks and 
balances mechanisms; autonomous organs are expected to check and confront each 
other in certain matters as well as cooperate in others.
(3) The categorization belongs to Ôzbudun (1993:279-280).
(4) Presidential system o f government or, simply put, presidentialism  here is 
meant to name the system which the 1787 Constitution established in the US and which 
survived to the present day despite certain modifications. The system has also existed in 
some Latin American countries, but they over time turned out to be authoritarian or 
have been overtaken by coup d'etats. It is beyond our purpose to concentrate on these 
polities. The focus therefore will be restricted to the position o f the president within the 
broader US system.
(5) This is the tendency or customary practice rather than a sine qua non. 
Indeed, membership or non-membership in Parliament is not determining in defining 
the system; the political responsibility o f the Ministers towards the Parliament and not 
their membership in it, is essential in parliamentary government.
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CHAPTER II
THE ÖZAL PRESIDENCY
October 1989 saw the elevation o f Turgut Özal to the presidency as the second 
president with a civilian background since 1946, when Turkey accomplished the 
transition to multi-party politics. (1) Before Özal was only Celal Bayar, who sat in the 
Presidential Palace in the decade o f  the 1950s. All other Presidents in Turkey in the 
period in question were o f a military origin; they were general-turned-presidents who 
were either outstanding members o f intervening juntas (i.e. Cemal Gürsel after the 
takeover o f 27 May 1960, and Kenan Evren that o f 12 September, 1980) or retired 
military men (i.e. Cevdet Sunay in 1966 and Fahri Koaıtürk in 1973).
Given this pattern o f affairs, therefore, Özal's election as president constituted a 
watershed in democratization in general and, civilianization in particular. The election 
constituted an impressive improvement in this regard, because, as William Hale (1990: 
1) noted, 'the succession o f a civilian politician did not produce the crisis in civil- 
military relations which could have been expected'.
Against this success in civilization o f the office of presidency stood, however, a 
crisis o f  political legitimacy surrounding the new president both before and after his 
election. Unlike the previous presidential elections, during which the political parties 
acted anxiously to back the military's candidate, tensions rose in 1989 between the 
government and opposition parties.
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2 .1 On the Eve o f the 1989 Presidential Election
After the by-elections o f 28 September 1986, the ruling Motherland Party 
(ANAP) and its leader Turgut Ozal became pressured to restore the political rights o f  
the pre-1980 leaders, including Suleyman Demirel. The message was implicit in that, 
while the ANAP's vote fell to 32 per cent (down from 41.5 per cent in the local 
elections o f 25 March 1984) another center-right party, the True Path Party (DYP) 
almost doubled its strength (from 13.72 per cent in 1984 to 23.7 per cent in 1986). 
Given this message, Ozal, instead o f amending the Constitution in Parliament, 
submitted the issue to a referendum held on 6 September 1987 in an apparent attempt to 
close up the file forever. The result, however, was a loss for him by less than a 1 per 
cent margin.
In an attempt to prevent the future erosion o f his party's social base, Ozal 
immediately called for early general elections to be held on 29 November 1987 with a 
new election law. In the elections, ANAP garnered 36.29 per cent of the vote and 
gained almost 65 per cent o f the parliamentary seats (292). The DYP and the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (SHP), the two parliamentary opposition parties until the 
general elections o f 20 October, 1991, could together only gain 158 seats with the 
remainder of the votes (19.15 per cent and 59 seats; 24.81 per cent and 99 seats, 
respectively).
Ozal gave the first hints o f his intention to stand as a presidential candidate in 
January 1988 (M illiyet, 12 January, 1988). He later noted that the president would be 
his party's choice because it had the required number o f votes, and that he, however, did 
not know whether he would be an ANAP deputy (M illiyet, 29 April, 1988). As Feroz 
Ahmad (1993:192) observed, however,
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[gjiven Ozal's failure to curb inflation or to amoraliate the 
country's ailing economy as he had promised, his standing 
among the voters eroded rapidly. No one realized that better 
than the pragmatic Ozal. In August 1988, he decided to call 
early local elections in November instead o f March 1989 before 
his situation become worse. As that measure required a 
constitutional amendment he placed it before the public in... [a] 
referendum. The opposition and the press turned the 
referendum o f 25 September into a vote o f confidence for Ozal, 
and the defeat o f his proposal by a margin o f 65 to 35 per cent 
was a severe below to his prestige.
Ozal had already declared as a pre-emptive statement that this party would stay 
in power until November 1992, the deadline of next general elections, whatever the 
result o f the referendum of 25 September 1988 would be (M illiyet, 27 August, 1988). 
Later he was to state that another referendum would be held for the popular election of 
the president, if the referendum o f 25 September, resulted in the positive for his 
proposal (M illiyet, 3 September, 1988). This was part o f his plan o f climbing to the 
presidency with amendment in the 1982 Constitution that would strengthen the office. 
(2)
Against such intentions of Özal (i.e. election as president by popular vote and 
with an enlarged scope of powers) came the first outcries from the opposition party 
leaders. The SHP leader, Erdal İnönü, reacted against the proposed method o f election 
on the grounds that it would amount to a system change, o f which, he said, he was in 
disfavor (M illiyet, 8 August, 1988). As regards who will be the next president, İnönü, 
and Deniz Baykal, the then general secretary o f the SHP, voiced the need to determine 
a candidate who would be acceptable to all three parliamentary parties (M illiyet., 19 
November, 1988; M illiyet, 30 December, 1988; M illiyet, 21 September, 1989).
Süleyman Demirel, the new leader of the DYP after the 1987 referendum, on 
the other hand, was sympathetic to the idea o f popular presidential election {M illiyet,
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23 June, 1988), in a way not to lead to the transformation o f the 1982 system of 
government into a presidential one (M illiyet, 22 October, 1988). He, and his 
predecessor as party chairman, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, warned the public that the 
referendum of 25 September was a rehearsal for the upcoming presidential election, and 
stated that a possible defeat for Özal should thus make him forget all his plans 
{M illiyet, 2 November, 1988).
Eyes had turned to President Kenan Evren for some time. Everybody wondered 
whether he wanted to continue in his post for another term, which was however only 
possible through a constitutional amendment. His spokesman, in face o f such rumors, 
declared that the President was 'worried about the reports and comments giving the 
impression that he was in search for [a second term]' {Milliyet, 9 January, 1988) and 
that he 'put forward neither a view nor a proposal concerning the rearrangement o f [his] 
presidential election' (M illiyet, 15 June, 1988). He later hinted that his second term as 
president could only be possible only if  those concerned approve the idea {Cumhuriyet, 
19 October, 1988). He also made it clear that he was in favor o f the idea o f popular 
election of the president {M illiyet, 10 May, 1988). As the Parliament failed to make the 
constitutional amendments either to make Evren's continuing for a second term or to 
effect the popular election of the President, attention was focused on Özal once again as 
the most likely candidate. The controversy over Özal's possible candidacy and later 
over his presidency was to accelerate from then on, and particularly after the local 
elections o f 26 March 1989, which were to mean an unmitigated disaster for the ANAP 
and its leader.
The local elections in question took on the form of a nationwide vote of 
confidence in the ANAP government. The parliamentary opposition parties both had 
already launched a campaign in the early days of the year to tell the people that their
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ballots for local administrators would also portray the overall electoral tendency. They 
described the occasion as a historic chance to contest Özal's power and show to the 
government that it no longer had the confidence o f the nation.
In the end, the ANAP faltered badly in the elections. It could only gamer the 
21.8 per cent o f the popular vote. By contrast, the SHP and the DYP received 29 per 
cent and 25 per cent o f the votes cast, respectively, the former now controlling a great 
many o f the municipalities. In the months to follow, these results were to be used by the 
opposition to hit the government throughout the year. The opposition parties, thus, 
claimed that the government had to call early elections because it lost moral authority 
and political legitimacy to continue to rule.
But Özal and the ANAP continued to hold on to power with overt confidence 
and determination, constantly denying that the local elections had anything to do with 
national politics. The election results were a public message to the ANAP government, 
discreetly calling for a change of policy and signaling a possible rebuke if it failed to 
’pull itself together'. Özal, too, accepted the importance o f this warning and 
immediately promised for changes to be made in an attempt to capture votes once 
again.
One serious mistake on the part o f Özal before the elections, which both cost 
him much credibility and served only to play in the opposition’s hands prior to the 
presidential election, was his last-minute announcement that he would resign if the 
results were an overwhelming defeat of his party.
The country was to witness a presidential election in such an atmosphere. As it 
became clear that there would be no sudden general elections, the controversy over the 
presidential election hotted still more. İnönü suggested until the last minute that the
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next president should be elected following consultations between the parliamentary 
parties (M iiliyet.; 26 September, 1989). He, after the elections o f 26 March, 
accompanied with Demirel in pressing for early elections. The latter forwarded the 
condition that Ôzal not insist on a candidate from among the ANAP members, while 
the former repeated his demand for compromise over naming the next president. 
(M illiyet, 21 September, 1989) As Ôzal turned deaf towards either suggestion, both 
promised to remove the 'ANAP's President', in the words o f Demirel, once they come to 
office.
The opposition thereafter launched separate, though similar, campaigns to 
prevent Özal's bid for the presidency. Both parties made the decision to boycott the 
election altogether, forcing the ANAP to have Özal elected with the votes only of his 
party's deputies. (3)
The option o f opposition party deputies resigning their seats en mass was one o f 
the so called threats intended to change Özal's mind at the last moment, but this was 
later to be ruled out by İnönü, who admitted that they had been 'somewhat emotional’ in 
their discussion of the idea from the beginning. Such a confession was in sharp contrast 
with Demirel's intransigent attitude; he not only declared that he and his party would 
not recognize the new president to be elected 'on the ANAP ticket' but also went as far 
as questioning the representativeness o f the Assembly and the legitimacy o f the 
government.
Özal's reply to such criticisms furthered the tension. He stated that questioning 
o f the legitimacy o f the government was nothing but questioning of the legitimacy of 
the Assembly because the former emerged from the latter, and that the legitimacy of 
those who do so was also open to question. Regarding the 'compromise' formula, on the
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other hand, Özal held that that was 'not a compromise but a dictation over the 
Assembly' {M illiyet, 12 October, 1989).
Özal, after stalling for time for long, declared his official candidacy on 18 
October 1989. He, doing so, disregarded the views o f thirty or so ANAP deputies 
(publicly known as Aksaçlılar), including the former Speaker Necmettin Karaduman, 
who argued that Özal had to seek a compromise solution ( Cumhuriyet, 12 July, 1989). 
The chorus o f opposition to Özal’s presidency was also attended by President Evren 
him self. (4)
Before the presidential election was an election for the office of the Speaker 
scheduled for September. Özal had his own candidate for the post (Yıldırım Akbulut), 
and the election was vital for Özal because it represented a rehearsal of the presidential 
election; Özal would test the extent to which the Aksaçlılar could challenge his 
candidate (and later himself). The election, boycotted by the DYP deputies, resulted in 
the way Özal had envisioned.
In the end, Özal was elected the eighth President on 31 October, 1989, with 263 
votes on the third ballot. Only 22 ANAP deputies maintained their opposition to Özal's 
presidency to the very end by that ballot. Of these, fourteen reportedly plumped for the 
only rival candidate, Fethi Çelikbaş, another ANAP deputy, while eight returned blank 
voting slips. Both opposition parties boycotted the election, as expected.
2.2 Özal as President
2.2.1 The Yıldırım Akbulut Government Period
With his assumption of the post began Özal's controversial presidency. The 
opposition parties boycotted the presidential oath-taking ceremony on 9 November,
37
1989, as part o f their policy o f non-recognition o f Özal's presidency.
The controversy stemmed in part from his continuing influence on the ANAP. 
As he had declared before his election, he appointed Yıldırım Akbulut as Prime 
Minister immediately after his inauguration in Parliament and nominated him as his 
successor for party chairmanship against real (Hasan Celal Güzel, a representative o f 
the province of Gaziantep) and potential candidates. Akbulut's name had not figured 
prominently in the speculation as to who the new Prime Minister would be, and he had 
not even been included in an earlier 'poll' conducted by Özal among the ANAP deputies 
on the question.
The Akbulut government was formed along the wishes of Özal. Its working 
program was later described by the former as 'a continuation o f 1983 and 1987 [party] 
programs'. It composed o f a coalition against the assertive and independent candidate 
Güzel. All these were well in line with Özal's future plans. He was determined to see 
his economic and political reforms continued to be carried out and, was aware that his 
sole choice for success would be a government with which he could work closely - a 
government which would work under him without creating troubles.
In the mid-November congress, the delegates kept to Özal's wish and elected 
Akbulut as the new party chairman by 739 votes against 382 for Güzel.
Özal's close contact with the party did not end with this congress. He, at times, 
received ANAP deputies (sometimes to an office in the Parliament building, Özal's use 
o f which, the opposition held, was inappropriate) and talked with them about party 
affairs. He had in fact stated in his first press conference as president that he would 
place special emphasis on the direction of the ANAP ( Cumhuriyet, 2 November. 1989). 
Furthermore, Özal publicly made comments not only about his former party but also
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about the opposition party. A case in point is his comment that Deniz Baykal, once 
İnönii's general secretary, had lost the congress to the latter in advance (Cumhuriyet, 2 
October, 1990).
Özal's activism was not confined to party affairs. He, prior to his election as 
president, had given signs that he would continue engaging heavily in executive 
functions (Milliyet., 16 October, 1989). As the president now he reshaped the new 
structure o f the executive agency, stating 'Before I was elected President [that is] when 
I was the Prime Minister, there was a very big difference of level between myself and 
the Ministers. But from now on, there will be a one centimeter difference o f level 
between the [new] Prime Minister and the Ministers' (M illiyet, 4 November, 1989). The 
statement was clear enough to indicate that the President was resolved to act as the real 
chief o f the executive, and the Prime Minister now no more primus inter pares, would 
and should be loyal to himself.
Indeed, things proceeded as Ozal had envisioned. He maintained his well-known 
concern with the economy. In the new cabinet (which is said to be Özal's own product), 
his cousin, Hüsnü Doğan was placed in charge of major economic affairs along with 
Ministers of State , Güneş Taner, one o f Özal’s right-hand men, and Işın Çelebi. These 
appointments w ere clear indicators of who would manage the Turkish economy.
In addition, Özal did not refrain from making statements on specific economic 
issues such as inflation (5). It was Özal who threatened the coal miners of Zonguldak to 
close down the mines if  they insist on high wage increases because such increases 
would mean to be an unaffordable burden on the national budget (M illiyet 6 
September, 1990). On yet another occasion, he stated that he 'told the authorities 
concerned that they support in a logical manner' the stock exchange market by lowering
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interest rates, effecting block sales, and so on {Sabah, 9 October, 1991).
Ózal also gave priority consideration to matters relating to law and order. He, 
when in the spring o f 1991 the subversive activities by secessionist groups in the 
southeast Anatolia required prompt action, as part o f his responsibility to safeguard the 
'indivisible integrity of the country and the nation', moved by convening the National 
Security Council, and later by inviting the leaders o f the parliamentary parties with the 
avowed purpose of discussing the matter and reaching a consensus over a solution. (6)
The eruption of the crisis (and later the outbreak o f war) in the Persian Gulf in 
August 1990 following the Iraqi invasion of the neighboring Kuwait played into Ózal's 
hands in foreign policy, an area in which he had not come to be much outspoken.
The Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister Ali Bozer took a cautious position 
when the first reports concerning the invasion appeared on the media. Ózal, back to 
Ankara from his presidential residence in Marmaris on the same day as the crisis 
erupted, however, reverted Turkey's position to one of taking sides. Conducting 
telephone diplomacy with the US President George Bush and regional leaders including 
Presidents Hafiz Assad, Husnu Mubaraq, and Hashimi Rafsanjani, he forced the 
Turkish government and foreign service to adopt an active policy so that Turkey could 
capture a seat at the negotiating table after the crisis (and war) has come to an end. In 
the manner, he by-passing the government, set up a Crisis Management Committee at 
the Palace, and forwarded an invitation to the opposition leaders to inform them o f the 
developments, an invitation the latter declined immediately (M iliiyet., 11 August, 1990) 
on the grounds that the President had to consider consulting the Assembly before 
adopting a central role on behalf o f the nation.
The opposition parties then jointly gave a motion of no confidence in the
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government's foreign policy. When the Parliament met to vote it, neither Demirel nor 
İnönü could find anything to criticize in what Özal said. Their criticism was directed 
instead towards how he acted. They, quite correctly, pointed that Özal was engaged in 
an effort to personally set Turkey's foreign policy although this was not within his 
authority. According to İnönü, this was due to Özal's enthusiasm for dictatorship, and 
for Demirel it was a constitutional violation; both the government and the ANAP, they 
held, were silent on the issue. Second, Özal's policy, based on by-passing the 
Parliament, the government, the opposition (all in all, the constitution) was, in the 
words o f İnönü, 'a policy open to adventurism'. Finally, they stated that any possible 
agreement reached in secret negotiations between Özal and Washington would not be 
binding for Turkey.
Özal’s sidestepping of the government also led to the lines o f responsibility 
being blurred. It was a Minister of State (Mehmet Keçeciler) who declared that the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline was shut down in conformity with the Council o f 
Ministers decision to implement the UN Security Council mandatory sanctions in 
principle. The Foreign Minister (Ali Bozer) was to find out about this development 
only from the newsmen. Further announcement relating to Turkey's compliance to the 
UN decisions (e.g. stopping all trade with Iraq, closing the Habur border door, and 
seizing all Iraq and Kuwait assets in Turkey) came from another Minister o f State, 
Güneş Taner. On an another occasion, the Foreign Minister was left out during a 
meeting between Özal and Bush in Washington although his counterpart (James Baker) 
and Özal's personal advisor (Nabi Şensoy) attended it (M illiyet, 4 October, 1990). 
Later, Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, who replaced Bozer as Foreign Minister after the latter's 
resignation, when asked about a Gulf policy issue, was to tell newsmen to direct their 
question to the President. Finally, the Chief of the General Staff, Necip Torumtay,
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resigned apparently in protest o f Ozal's high-handed style (M illiyet, 4 December, 1990).
The confusion on who was responsible for what functions was in fact not new. 
Akbulufs failure to duly perform the functions entrusted to him had earlier resulted in 
the resignation of Mesut Yilmaz as Foreign Minister. Such failure was also to lead the 
Minister o f Finance and Customs to quit office. The crisis therefore only increased the 
speed o f resignations, creating another crisis in Turkey, as Akbulut was reduced to play 
a supporting role.
Akbulut's self-proof came only with his opposition to Ozal's request for an 
authorization to be used to declare a war and to send troops to foreign countries. 
(Gokmen, 1992: 191) Under the 1982 Constitution the authority is entrusted to the 
Parliament (article 92). Ozal argued that such a regulation was obsolete because in the 
rapidly changing would of the day, warfare has become a matter of seconds, and that 
the government thus needed the authority to use in case of a sudden armed aggression. 
(7) Akbulut resolved the problem by making a distinction between declaring a war 
against an aggressor (for which he stated he would take on to himself the 
responsibility), on the one hand, and sending troops to a foreign land, on the other 
hand, and by transferring that authorization to the general staff in an apparently 
preemptive move to eliminate a possible pressure from Ozal to send troops to the Gulf 
{M illiyet, 18 January, 1991).
Akbulut's second major disagreement with Ozal was to be upon the demands of 
coal miners in Zonguldak for high wage increases. Earlier, as stated above, Ozal had 
stated that the state could not afford to pay the amount the miners demanded, given that 
the Hard Coal Board ( Tiirkiye Komur Isletmeien), a State Economic Enterprise (SEE), 
was already making a loss and, even threatened to close down the mines and import
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coal more cheaply instead (8). At that time, Akbulut, too, had found the workers’ 
demand as exorbitant (M illiyet, 4 December, 1990) . As the strike was prolonged too 
long amounting to a political show-off (with the union's decision to have the workers 
walk to Ankara), Akbulut gave in to the union at the expense of his Finance Minister 
(Adnan Kahveci) and President Ozal.
Ozal's self-justification o f the dominance of the executive and his former party 
was many-fold. Before his elevation to the presidency, he had already made it clear that 
he would actively engage in executive functions because 'it is neither possible nor 
correct for a person, who has dealt with Turkey's problems so much, to stop doing so’. 
After all, he was 'a politician' and therefore could not be expected not to 'engage into 
politics'. As such, he was a 'different kind o f president', one who 'the citizens ought to 
get accustomed to’.
Second, Ozal argued that Turkish Presidents should henceforth be of a civilian 
rather than a military origin, that, if these were to be civilian presidents, they were 
bound to emerge from the ranks of politician, and would have political opinions, and 
that they cannot therefore be expected to be impartial in the same sense as the 
figurehead presidents o f the previous decades had been (9). In particular, it is patently 
out o f question for a President himself, who has come straight from the prime ministry, 
where he spent six years at the head of a party government, which he himself founded, 
to cease to feel a particular responsibility for that party or to meet and offer advices to 
its new leader and officials. The extra powers given to the presidency by the 1982 
Constitution, Ozal argued, already indicated that a stronger presidency was foreseen at 
the time it was penned. As such, the presidency, Ozal maintained, was granted wide 
powers not unlike the 1958 French Constitution.
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Third, Özal, continuing on the same theme, claimed that there was nothing 
inappropriate in his using all the powers in their entirety bestowed upon him by the 
Constitution because, after all, it was to the best interest o f the country that the 
government take into account his views resulting from his accumulation o f knowledge 
and experience. He always denied that he doubled as Prime Minister on the grounds 
that it was his duty to warn the government by presenting his 'advice' when it goes on 
the wrong way, while also noting that the final responsibility was due to that body.
Özal's final point o f self-legitimation was his presentation o f the Evren 
presidency as a precedent. He once said 'Evren's intervention in my conduct o f affairs 
[when I was the Prime Minister] was all the more pervasive than mine at the time' 
{Hürriyet, 7 January, 1990).
None o f Özal's arguments was convincing enough to make the opposition 
leaders leave their contentions. Both insisted that he was elected by an unrepresentative 
ANAP majority in Parliament and has acted in a partisan manner and at times doubled 
as the Prime Minister, drifting the system to, in înönü's words, a 'de facto presidential 
system'. Both refused to participate in the summits (the first following the eruption o f 
the crisis in the Gulf and the other in his 1991 New Year message for a social consensus 
between the political parties to cope with the country's urgent problems, most notably 
inflation) the president announced, on the grounds that Özal was after the legitimation 
o f his single-handed rule. Both promised to topple Özal from office by effecting the 
required constitutional amendment jointly after the next election in an attempt to 'call 
him to account'. They later even revitalized the old formula o f resigning en mass from 
Parliament to force the government to go to early elections - a tactic that they could 
never operationalize, fearing a possible total or partial loss in a by-election, which 
would be urgent if they did so.
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The hostile attitudes o f the President, on the one hand, and of the opposition 
towards one another, the former usurping the government's power on many occasions 
(to the extent o f requesting the dismissal of a minister from the Prime Minister on the 
grounds that the former opposed Mrs. Semra Özal's candidacy for chairmanship in a 
provincial party branch, thus, o f reverting the constitutional practice with the help of 
presidential immunity, i.e. the absence o f any constitutional arrangement to control and 
confine his political notion) and the acquiescence of the government, and the latter 
refusing to recognize the President’s competence even on matters o f vital and urgent 
significance to the country, and always claiming an early election as the only way out 
o f impasse, led to a crisis situations in the political scene in Turkey whereby 'some were 
for Özal to the bitter end, while others were dead set against him, with neither side 
willing even to attempt a reconciliation'. (Heper, 1992: 113)
2.2.2 The Mesut Yılmaz Government Period
It was such an atmosphere in which the ANAP congress was to be held. Mesut 
Yılmaz, the ex-Foreign Minister, was added to the two candidates of the previous 
congress, Yıldırım Akbulut and Hasan Celal Güzel, from which the former had 
emerged victorious, with his official declaration of candidacy for party chairmanship on 
10 May 1991. Because the party was Özal's 'child' and because he could not be expected 
to stay idle, as Özal himself put it, everyone wondered his position. He, as expected, 
therefore, received ANAP deputies, delegates, and provincial party chiefs, to conduct a 
survey o f his own on who they wished to see as chairman, recommended them to elect 
the candidate who could earn the party the most votes (a recommendation widely 
interpreted as his implicit support to Yılmaz), commented on the candidates, proposed 
that the party chairmanship and the prime ministry could be separately granted to two 
of the candidates without pronouncing names, and in the end stated that he would
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remain neutral. In the event, Yılmaz, knowing that victory was impossible despite Özal, 
moved carefully in his references to the latter, once praising Özal as the 'greatest name 
[read, politician] ever in Turkish politics' ( Cumhuriyet, 12 June, 1991). Aware o f the 
reactions to Özal's high-handed style, however, Yılmaz equally carefully based his 
strategy on the existence o f a 'leadership vacuum', underlining the need to 'transform 
the party from a "leader" into a "team" party'. When asked whether he expected Özal's 
support, Yılmaz stated that the President had to remain neutral, and that he expected 
'support from the bottom [read, the delegates], not from above [read, the President]' 
{Sabah, 2 June, 1991).
In the end, Yılmaz was elected the new chairman of the ANAP in June 1991 and 
soon replaced Akbulut as Premier (10). In his speech after he emerged victorious in the 
congress, Yılmaz stated that Özal was the 'spiritual and eternal leader* o f the party, from 
whose experience and foresight the party will continue to benefit. However, he was also 
of the opinion that the party had to transform itself into an institutionalized entity, in a 
way not to be in need of Özal's guidance in the day-to-day conduct of affairs. This 
practically meant to cleanse the image o f 'guided Premier’ widely associated with 
Akbulut and likely to be done so with Yılmaz himself if  he continued in the same 
manner as the former. This, in turn, necessitated the relegation of Özal to his 
constitutional position, refusing the continuance of his weight on governmental action. 
All these were necessary, Yılmaz apparently thought. He was to put his plan into effect 
on a gradual basis so as not to provoke Özal's and others' storm of protests.
Soon after his assumption of premiership, Yılmaz, in an attempt to put a halt to 
the position of ministers as presidential subordinates, stated publicly '[My] fellow 
ministers may get in direct touch with Özal. But this is to take place within my 
knowledge and the final practice is up to my approval' {M illiyet, 23 July, 1991). Later,
46
proving to be a wrong choice for Özal, Yılmaz boosted public salaries and wages (an 
eighty per cent increase, reportedly amounting to an extra burden o f TL 32 trillion on 
the budget) despite Özal's outcry to the contrary.(l 1)
A further disagreement between Özal and Yılmaz was unfolded when the 
former delayed his approval of government decrees revising the structure o f the central 
administration and reorganizing certain public agencies connected with the economy. 
The latter in particular was a challenging one for Özal, because it would mean, the 
replacement of a network of economic technicians loyal to him by a new one that 
would be under the new Deputy Prime Minister Ekrem Pakdemirli, who the Prime 
Minister had declared would henceforth be in charge o f the Turkish economy.
Finally, the Cyprus issue led to another rift between the two men. Özal had 
announced that a quadripartite summit was the best way to hammer out a solution to the 
problem, which, he saw, was a major obstacle before Turkey. He, when the issue was 
raised again, proposed to effect his solution as soon as possible. Yılmaz, however, 
objected on account that no such summit should be held unless the truly proper ground 
prevailed.
As the economic balance deteriorated extremely and the Yılmaz government 
apparently perceived it unmendable in a period o f one year and a half (until when the 
next general election was due), a decision was made to hold early elections on 20 
October 1991. It was during the campaign period that Yılmaz divorced the ANAP 
farther from Özal, a process that was to continue after the election to a point o f actual 
severity o f all ties.
The upcoming elections were critical for Özal, because the opposition parties 
both repeatedly pledged to dislodge him. The same thesis was maintained now, too, as
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the election calendar proceeded. Özal felt compelled to launch his own campaign, after 
the new team of leaders that controlled the ANAP publicly stated that Özal shoidd take 
a back seat, and that Yılmaz alone would make a better appeal to the electorate, and, as 
Yılmaz preferred to base his party’s campaign strategy on themes o f his youth and 
serious outlook, on a confession of the past mistakes in government, and on a new party 
image that was no longer at the beck and call o f its founder - none o f which mentioned 
Özal’s record in office as Prime Minister. (12)
In the manner, Özal criticized those in the ANAP who ’advised’ him not to 'react 
to the opposition', arguing that the ANAP would not even be able to obtain the 10 per 
cent o f the popular vote needed to ensure parliamentary representation were it not for 
him. Seeing that party as the only reliable ally in Parliament, however, Özal 
campaigned on its behalf, though without pronouncing its name. He, during several 
public speeches he delivered during the campaign period, called on the nation to 
consider careftilly the state of the country ten years ago and the conditions that prevail 
now (i.e. to see the progress) and to discard exaggerated promises (See, for instance, 
Hürriyet, 1 October, 1991).
Özal's propaganda led to uptones o f language used by the opposition leaders. 
Demirel declared his campaign as a 'war o f liberation against the Çankaya [read, the 
Presidential Palace] Party' and claimed that Özal would leave the office of his own 
accord, whatever the election results. İnönü, on the other hand, suggested Özal to quit 
office, return to the headship of the ANAP, and fight the elections that way. He later 
was to go to the extreme o f claiming that no democracy was possible with Özal 
continuing as President.
The bickering went on until the elections were held. Özal, as his 'right o f reply'
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stemming from such criticisms, pointed out that he was 'ready for a fate like that of 
[Adnan] Menderes’, the Turkish Prime Minister in the decade of the 1950s who was 
hanged in 1961 upon a court decision following the military takeover of 1960, and that 
no one except God could call him to account. Moreover, another round of debate on 
effecting constitutional amendment for popular presidential election began as Özal 
stated that he was ready to compete with Demirel and İnönü in such a race. Özal 
attached to his suggestion the condition that the presidential, parliamentary, and local 
elections all held at the same time. The former replied in the positive on the condition 
that Özal not compete as an incumbent president, while the latter as always opposed as 
a matter o f principle.
2.2.3 The Süleyman Demirel Government Period
In the elections in question, the ANAP faltered terribly. It won 24 per cent o f 
the votes cast, which earned it 115 seats. The DYP was the party which gained the 
plurality o f the votes and accordingly to the plurality o f the parliamentary seats (27 and 
178, respectively). Its coalition partner-to-be, the SHP obtained 21 per cent and 
boasted 88 seats. The Democratic Left Party (DSP) under the former Premier Bülent 
Ecevit (in the 1970s) scored 11 per cent and garnered 7 parliamentary seats. Finally, 
the pro-Islamic Prosperity Party (RP) under Necmettin Erbakan won 17 per cent and 62 
seats.(13)
The election results made the prospect of dislodging Özal from the post through 
a constitutional amendment look a distant one, for it would take an alliance o f virtually 
all the groupings represented in the Parliament, beside the ANAP, to establish the two- 
thirds parliamentary majority to amend the Constitution.! 14)
It was widely observed then that Demirel toned down his language greatly vis-a­
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vis what he called the 'Çankaya issue'. He spoke of the 'new conditions' created by the 
election results and, noted that Ôzal would from then on have to act within the limits o f 
his constitutional authority. He, however, was also obliged to make some show o f effort 
to oust Ôzal, because failure to do so would leave him open to blames o f going back on 
his words. In this context, he, during his consultations with the party leaders designed 
to seek an exchange o f views on the problems of the country also talked to them on the 
Çankaya issue, before actually looking into the prospects for a coalition. He later 
distributed to the press the texts o f draft amendments to the constitution, which his 
party drew up in an attempt to unseat Ozal.(15) Neither the RP (which bargained to 
become a coalition partner - something unacceptable to Demirel because he had 
unpleasant memories with Erbakan during their coalition in the I970's - and/or to agree 
on an acceptable name) nor the ANAP and the DSP (which stated that there were more 
important things to get on with than replacing the president with a new one) lent 
support to the idea.
Furthermore, Ôzal made an announcement, repeated in his message to the 
nation on the Republic Day (29 October), that he would revert to a traditional 
presidential role (M illiyet, 30 October, 1991) (16). The statement would make it risky 
for Demirel to make too much of a fuss about unseating him before even a government 
was formed. His conciliatory remarks had in fact began at the election night when he 
said he would confer the task of forming a government on the leader of the party 
whoever that might be. He later pointed out that this was not a written obligation on 
him but a convention, and that going in person to the Presidential Palace to have the 
task conferred on one was a convention, too. In an attempt not to look the conceding 
side at the onset o f the game, Demirel, in response, stated that it was not a case o f the 
sultan appointing a vizier, and that the job of forming the government had been granted
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to him by the people. Later he was to say that he would go ahead and form a 
government whether asked to by the president or not.
Just prior to the above last statement of Demirel, Özal had publicly issued the 
invitation (three days in advance even as Demirel was visiting party leaders to discuss 
his party's draft constitutional amendments aimed at replacing Özal), Demirel 
responded to Özal's invitation, as he put it himself, to avoid a crisis 'at the top' and to 
show that his campaign on the presidency was not a personal matter but one of 
principle. He also added that 'shaking Özal's hand' was but a formality not to be taken to 
mean that he would cease to attempt to remove Özal from the post. Such mutual 
understanding was to  put an end to mutual nonrecognition; a 'ceasefird (i.e. a modus 
vivedi ) was negotiated. Yet the ceasefire stopped short o f ending age-old bickering 
between the leaders in question, even once leading to another round of threats on the 
part o f  Demirel to unseat Özal.
At the stage of the formation o f the new government and for a short time 
afterwards, the relations between Özal and the new government proceeded rather 
smoothly; the state organs were functioning in a harmonious manner. It was stated by 
Demirel that neither himself nor Özal could change one another (M illiyet, 24 February, 
1992). He thought that he, Özal, and İnönü were a good team to resolve the country's 
huge problems (Hürriyet, 6 January, 1992). He later stated that all members o f the 
Council o f Ministers including himself would consult Özal, when necessary 
( Cumhuriyet, 4 January, 1992). He really did so at times. Once he even called up Özal 
from abroad, where he was on an official visit, to inform him about his contacts 
( Cumhuriyet, 16 February, 1992). Özal, in exchange, approved Demirel's Council o f 
Ministers without any objection. He later also praised the government for it maintained 
free market model in the economy (Hürriyet, 25 February, 1992). (17)
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Not much long from such an atmosphere of mutual understanding, however, 
Özal began to criticize and comment on the government, its ministers and policies, on 
the one hand, and proposed his own measures, failure to take which, he argued, would 
drift the country into immobilisme, on the other. His first comment was on the possible 
lifetime of the existing coalition government (Milliyet, 22 November, 1991). Later, he 
criticized the economic program of the government as being full o f unrealistic goals 
(notably in its pledge to bring down the inflation rate sharply in a period o f 500 days) 
{Sabah, 6 December, 1991). When the terroristic activities spread to metropoles, Özal 
argued that it was the work of those who deserted from prison after their transfer from 
the Eskişehir Jail which had been closed down by the government on account o f its 
conditions being inhumane to live. On another occasion, Özal did not refrain from 
criticizing İnönü for equating politics with 'producing polemics’ {Sabah, 27 March, 
1992).
As for his suggestions, they were mainly over the economy, foreign policy, and 
law and order. Besides offering his general views, Özal put forward specific remedies 
in these regards. He, for instance, made a distinction between the 'southeast problem', 
which, according to Özal, was more or less a 'Kurdish problem', on the one hand, and 
the 'terror problem' (i.e. the problem created by secessionist groups which stage 
subversive activities particularly in southeast Anatolia) The former, Özal held, required 
a parliamentary consensus, the enlargement o f some rights to the people o f the region 
(like, for instance, broadcasting and education in Kurdish, which, Özal maintained, was 
not against the Constitution) and so on (Hürriyet, 12 December, 1991). He, in this 
connection, stated that every formula including a federative solution should be debated 
in an attempt to prove that that solution was unworkable. The terror issue, on the other 
hand, Özal added , could be resolved through hawkish measures {M illiyet 4 December,
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1992); in the event an amnesty had to be issued for the terrorists in an attempt to divide 
them among themselves ( Cumhuriyet; 13 April, 1992). It is hard to say that the 
government felt pleased with such an approach. On the first point, Demirel indicated 
'Turkey is a unitary state. The debate on federation is wrong. I recognize the Kurdish 
identity. [By that ] I mean it is not to be said "you are Turkish" to my citizens who say 
"I am Kurdish"...The Kurd... too is an owner o f this state, [and] possesses equal rights' 
(M illiyet, 23 March, 1992). In the meantime, Demirel asked why Özal failed to initiate 
the Kurdish broadcasting and education projects when he was the Prime Minister, and 
declared that it was the Constitution, rather not himself personally, that made them 
impossible. On the second point, Özal and Demirel seemed to be on the same parallels 
with the exception, however, o f the former's proposal for a pervasive amnesty.
In foreign policy, Özal again urged the government to take an active policy, 
warning that failure to do so would deprive the country of the chance to exploit the 
favorable conditions that have emerged 'for the first time in the latest three to four 
centuries’. In this context, Özal again conducted telephone diplomacy with world 
leaders including President Bush and the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in an 
attempt to pressure them for moving to stop the bloodshed in Nagoma-Karabagh (18) 
and Bosnia-Herzegovenia. (19) His contacts with the anti-systemic leaders in Iraq, 
which he maintained since the Gulf War, should also be seen in this light (20). They 
had led to the opposition’s reactions, earning Demirel a court suit after he stated that 
what the President was doing was 'ignorance, error, treachery’. Now Deputy Premier 
İnönü characterized Özal's initiative as 'meddling in the internal affairs o f a foreign 
country'.
In the domain o f the economy, too, did Özal make general comments and 
suggestions beside his aforementioned criticisms on specific policies. Moreover, he
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requested the ministers and bureaucrats responsible for the conduct o f the economy to 
brief him and then to pay attention to his views {Sabah, 25 December, 1991).
When Özal perceived that his advices were given short shrift and was not 
informed o f the upcoming government decrees, he for a long time (until he was again 
threatened to be unseated) began to veto a number of laws and decrees having force of 
law. Özal had used his constitutional power o f veto earlier during the premierships o f 
Akbulut and Yılmaz for the same reason. This time, however, he delayed his approval 
o f the legislation longer (once even exceeding the fifteen day limit under the 
Constitution). Özal returned some laws and decrees to the Assembly for reconsideration 
because the new appointees were partisan and/or were to replace the bureaucrats which 
the ANAP governments had installed. A case in point was the appointment o f an ex- 
SHP party official (Yiğit Gülöksüz) to the headship o f the Mass Housing Agency 
(Toplu Konut İdaresi). Özal vetoed some other decrees on the grounds that they were 
contrary to the law. An example o f this category includes those decrees regarding the 
rescheduling of the public institutions and organization. A third category was composed 
o f those laws and decrees that, Özal felt, were to harm the economy (eg., the laws on 
early retirement and the adoption o f an International Labor Organization convention). 
Virtually all o f his arguments in returning such legislations were disregarded by the 
government which blamed him of blocking governmental action as the 'representative 
o f the opposition’. The Ministers began failing to attend the briefings at the Presidential 
Palace and the protocol ceremonies like welcoming and seeing off the President. Özal’s 
portraits in the airport halls were lifted in accordance with the directive of the Minister 
o f Transport. In the meantime, Özal’s favorite bureaucrats were removed from their 
office. (21)
In this juncture, Demirel again talked of removing Özal. This was a short-lived
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threat, however, as the opposition parties in Parliament maintained their earlier 
positions in this regard. Not much long afterwards a new formula was adopted and 
effected - that of by-passing the President in appointments. The first law that by-passed 
the President in appointments (of, for instance, the undersecretaries and their deputies, 
the ministerial counselors, the head of the central bank, and directors general) was 
vetoed by the President on grounds o f unconstitutionality. Özal argued that Demirel, 
through this law, sought to create a ’prime ministerial system' which was far apart from 
the 1982 Constitution (Hürriyet, 28 February, 1993). He declared in a purposively held 
press conference that Demirel's allegation that he blocked the functioning o f the state by 
delaying legislation too long (Demirel held that every legislation was delayed 25.4 days 
on average for approval) was misleading; Özal maintained that his performance in 
approval was a record {Sabah, 7 March, 1993).
As the 'Çankaya inspector’, to use Demirel's description o f Özal, saw the law 
was returned to him in its original form, he submitted it to the Constitutional Court. In 
the meantime, the government prepared a second law of this sort despite Özal's request 
to wait until the Court decides on the first one. A second conciliatory attempt by Özal 
was his willingness to give up some of his powers to the government, as the Speaker 
Hüsamettin Cindoruk declared after his meeting with Özal {Sabah, 6 March, 1993).
Demirel moved with determination, however. The second by-pass law was in 
Özal's hands before the court decision. Özal then said 'Responsibility belongs 
[completely] to the government for all events that will occur from now on' {M illiyet, 4 
March, 1993). The first by-pass law was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Court, and the second bill was never enacted. (22)
Özal's role as a retiring and constitutional President became more evident as the
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new leader of his former party took a course increasingly independently o f him. Yılmaz 
had promised before the July 1991 congress to transform the ANAP from a leader into 
a team party, without, however, openly challenging Özal not to alienate him too much. 
During the campaign of 20 October elections, likewise, he refused to use Özal's legacy 
in office as a way o f capturing votes and talked o f the mistakes as well as the 
accomplishment of the ANAP governments under Özal. It was Özal more than Yılmaz 
at the time who reacted to the then opposition leaders Demirel and İnönü who 
contended that the ANAP governments ruled the country in a terrible fashion, bringing 
it on the verge of a collapse. In face o f similar statements by the now Premier Demirel, 
it was again to be Özal who was to oppose.
The relations between Özal on the one hand and Yılmaz and the ANAP on the 
other strained further after the October 20 elections, as the latter went on a route 
different from the one Özal had envisioned. Özal began to criticize Yılmaz just after the 
said elections on account that he failed during the campaign to defend the Özal years in 
government and to ensure the maintenance of the support of the nationalist- 
conservative votes (.Hürriyet, 31 October, 1991). Later he urged the party to become 
more influential as the main opposition party ( Cumhuriyet, 8 March, 1992). As Özal 
perceived that this and other advices o f him were disregarded, he blamed Yılmaz o f 
turning the party status - quo oriented, not unlike the other parties, at a time when it had 
to defend radical measures to capture votes as he himself had done as Premier. Özal 
was once even to declare that he found Demirel nearer to himself than Yılmaz 
{Hürriyet, 29 September, 1992).
In view of these and other criticisms, Yılmaz, who already saw the identification 
o f the ANAP with Özal as a liability rather than an asset, moved with a calculated 
patience to dissociate the party further from Özal. By the time, not only Yılmaz himself
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but also some o f those ANAP deputies who had come to be known as Özaiist began 
criticizing Özal’s urge to keep his hands in the party. Taking advantage o f such near- 
unity, Yılmaz stated that he would not consult Özal on party affairs. When Özal spoke 
o f allowing for broadcasting and education in Kurdish, Yılmaz told that these were the 
President’s personal views and had nothing to do with the party ( Cumhuriyet, 24 April, 
1992). There was still some similarity between Özal's and the ANAP's approach to 
policy issues, but this was no more than a convergence o f views between the President 
and any other political party. A case in point is the above example, whereby Yılmaz 
declared his party's support for a debate on Kurdish broadcasting and education, albeit, 
unlike Özal, not backing the policy itself. Yılmaz also never lent its support to the idea 
o f unseating Özal earlier in the grounds that the latter was the ANAP's symbol, and 
later as a matter o f principle (by saying that such a move was personally directed and 
was to be harmful to the office  o f the presidency). Another instance is Yilmaz's pro- 
Özal attitude toward Demirel's unwillingness to allow Özal sign the treaty on the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme originally proposed by Özal (Sabah, 26 June, 
1992).
As he was not satisfied with Yilmaz's performance as a leader not subservient to 
himself, Ozal lobbied for a new chairman to be elected in an early congress. Under such 
a pressure, Yilmaz hesitated for a while. Later however he decided to call an early 
congress, warning Ozal not to meddle in it. Then Ozal spoke o f returning to party 
politics as the ANAP leader (when he thought the people were in need o f himself) so as 
to undertake the reforms which he thought to be imperative. In the meantime, Yilmaz's 
rival in the coming congress, Mehmet Kececiler, campaigned with the main theme that 
'The votes to be cast for [him] will be cast for Ozal and his tenets' {Sabah, 19 
November, 1992). Such state o f affairs led Yylmaz to threaten to lend support to the
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plans of removing Özal by referring to 'Menderes' fate' ( Türkiye, 27 November, 1992), 
and to declare the congress as one between himself and Özal (Hürriyet, 15 November, 
1992).
The congress, therefore, became a zero-sum game. To Yılmaz, Özal sought 'a 
chairman who [was] not a leader', one whom to replace when back in politics (Sabah, 
21 September, 1992). Özal did little to deny the contention. He declared that he would 
sever all his ties with the ANAP completely, if Yılmaz won (M illiyet, 30 November, 
1992); this was what was to happen. After the congress Yılmaz established a firm 
control o f his own over the ANAP that was no longer to challenged by Özal.
In the days to come, Yılmaz made his decision not to personally participate in 
the welcoming and seeing-off ceremonies for Özal (Sabah, 22 February, 1992), and 
declared 'We will maintain Özal's rights, but not repeat his wrongs' (Hürriyet, 13 
December, 1992). When Özal was criticized, to Yılmaz, in an unjust manner, the latter 
said he would continue to defend the President for 'no one [had] the right to insult the 
highest office of the state' (ibid.). He, finally, did not allow any o f his deputies to 
participate in the parliamentary sessions on the by-pass laws, pointing out the necessity 
to take up the issue not from the point o f view o f persons but from that o f principles 
and the systemic unity (Cumhuriyet, 3 March 1992).
2.3 Systemic Transformation
Back to Özal, he, to a large extent, stopped criticizing either the government 
policies (except the by-pass laws with fairly reasonable explanations), or one or the 
other o f the opposition parties. He instead concentrated heavily on what may be called 
system ic transformation (23). This was in fact not new. He had voiced a need for 
radical measures, the failure to initiate which would lead to the political system's
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suicide. None o f his suggestions had been taken seriously by Demirel and his 
government, no matter what merits they involved.
Ozal now engaged in an effort to publicize his views which he presented under 
the title of the 'Second Transformation Prograrri. The Third Economy Congress o f  
izm ir{held on 4 June 1992) was a convenient platform to unfold his program in part. 
He began his speech there by saying 'Today I would like to comment on the course of 
the Turkish economy [and] to share with you my expectations, suggestions and desires 
concerning the decade that lies ahead o f us' (Ozal, 1993:147). He described the decade 
o f the 1980s as one in which 'the mentality placing the state above the individual' died 
away (Ozal, 1993:148), and, after repeating the goals he had set in the Second 
Economy Congress o f  Izm ir ( 1981) when he was the deputy Prime Minister, stated that 
those goals had been accomplished. He then set a new list o f goals which, if 
accomplished, he believed, would make Turkey a member of the most advanced 
countries, which were ten to fifteen in number. Finally, he, after noting that the Turkish 
people had the potential to become a 'great nation', stated 'If we do not make serious 
mistakes, the twenty-first century will be one for the Turks and Turkey' (Ozal, 
1993:163).
Ozal in the period under consideration explained his views on several platforms. 
In addition to the above views, he argued for the presidential system replacing the 
existing predominantly parliamentary one for a number o f discernible reasons.
First, the parliamentary system of government, Ozal believed, produced political 
instability (’bottlenecks') in countries (like Turkey) with culturally heterogeneous 
societies. This was because in such polities the system could not integrate its 
population. The result then was 'political divisions’, 'partisanship', and clientelism.
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leading ultimately to coalition governments, which, by their very nature could not cope 
with urgent problems. Second, the presidential rather than the parliamentary system, 
Ozal argued, was 'suitable to our historical character and tradition'. Third, he held, in 
parliamentarism the leader of the governing party dominated the assembly, while in 
presidential government, on the other hand, the assembly better controlled the executive 
through the checks and balances mechanisms. Fourth, Ozal noted the 'changing 
technology and changing international conditions requirefd] swift decision making and 
practicing and the president [could] make immediate decisions'. Fifth, Ozal said 'The 
delegation o f power [was] easier in presidential system; bureaucratic obstacles [were] 
minimized'. Sixth, another advantage of presidentialism according to Ozal was that 
'because it [was] the people who elected] the president directly, the person who [stood] 
for the presidency as a candidate [had] to produce and develop solutions to the main 
issues'. Seventh, Ozal argued, unlike parliamentarism, in presidentalism, the president, 
taking advantage o f being elected by a wide popular vote (at least a simple majority), 
could 'undertake difficult and comprehensive reforms without any fear'. The final point 
in Ozal's argument was 'There exist problems that there are sensitive [in Turkey]. For 
instance, the disturbances concerning the freedom of the religion and conscience or, the 
Kurdish problem. The president... would find an advantageous environment in these 
and other matters. Because the presidential candidate and the later president would not 
be able to find any support behind him if he failed to make good choices' (Nokta, 7 
April, 1993).
Another sub-heading o f Ozal's program was the minimalization of the state. He 
proposed a servant state dealing only with matters o f 'security, law and order, and 
national defense'. Ozal's minimal state was to limit itself to engaging in infrastructure 
services as far as the economy was concerned. To this end, Ozal argued for
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privatization in education (leading to the abolishment o f the Republican practice o f 
unified education) of the state economic enterprises (most being in loss already) and of 
social security and health. Moreover, Ozal felt the need for comprehensive reform in 
administration (in for instance taxation and judiciary), and for adoption o f an active, 
power-seeking foreign policy understanding based on power expansionism.
As stated above, Ozal was planning to returning to party politics in an attempt to 
undertake the mentioned 'reforms'. Those who had left the ANAP and launched a new 
political movement upon Ozal's inculcation after the latest ANAP congress were 
waiting for him to head them at a time when Ozal felt the people were 'in need' o f him. 
Ozal however was never to do what he suggested due to his death on 17 April, 1992.
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NOTES
(1) This chapter mainly draws upon Metin Heper (1992), Feroz Ahmad (1993), 
and M illiyet (from  1 January, 1988 to 18 April, 1993).
(2) Shutting his ears to the opposition's constant pressure to call early elections, 
Özal pressed for a new constitution. He, in retrospect, apparently took it for granted that 
he would be elected president anyway and now wanted to assume the post with a new 
constitution that would strengthen his hand all the more (see, for instance, M illiyet, 2 
June, 1989). As this tactic proved to be vein however he stated repeatedly that the 
election would be made by the then present Assembly (see, for instance, Cum huriyet 9 
October, 1989). In this decision, two factors seem to be influential. The first one was 
the constantly decreasing public support behind himself and the second was the still 
strong popular base o f Evren who hinted that he could accept the invitation if  offered.
(3) Aside from a group o f around 30, all ANAP deputies were in support o f a 
possible Özal bid for the office, albeit for different reasons.
(4) Evren hinted before the 1989 presidential election that he did not personally 
back Özal's candidacy (M illiyet, 8 September, 1989). He later, in 1990, openly stated 
that he 'suggested Özal thrice not to be a president' because it was difficult for him to 
keep impartial ( Türkiye, 2 July, 1990).
(5) He, for instance, once said that the rate o f inflation would decrease to 14 per 
cent in 1994 (M illiyet, 10 May, 1991).
(6) It was İnönü first who accepted the invitation, noting, however, that 
participation in such a summit should not be taken to mean quitting insistence on an 
early general election. Demirel also later gave a positive answer with the explanation
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that the state interests were above all political ambitions. Ôzal, after the summit, stated 
that the party leaders ’acted with unity' and that the talks were held in a very positive 
atmosphere. He added that the leaders were told o f the upcoming measures -the so 
called 'decrees o f censorship and banishment’ coined as such by the press after being 
taken by the Council o f Ministers meeting under Ôzal's chairmanship, in accordance 
with a National Security Council decision - and that there was a 'general consensus on 
the general points'. These additions were later denied by both opposition leaders, who 
took a critical stance against the measures on the grounds that the decrees contained 
items prejudicial to human rights and press freedoms. In response to these criticism and 
in an attempt to undo the SHP's appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment o f 
the decrees, Ôzal was later to fervently defend them by portraying them as a 'guarantee 
for the indivisible integrity o f the country' dealing 'a blow to terror' and stating he 'will 
in no way allow these decrees to be misunderstood’. As the episode suggests, Ôzal was 
in firm control of national policy issues, and specially those relating to law and order. 
The summit finally had another significance: the opposition for the first time engaged 
in an affair that would constitute a temporary deviation from their reputed policy o f 
nonrecognition of the 'unjust occupation' o f the Presidential Palace -' temporary’ 
because both leaders o f opposition claimed that Ôzal used the meeting as a way o f 
legitimating his presidency.
(7) The Constitution in fact enpowers the President to 'decide to mobilize the 
Turkish armed forces...[i]f the country is subjected, while the TGNA is adjourned or in 
recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide 
immediately on the use o f armed forces' (article 92). It can be argued, therefore, Ôzal 
seeking the authorization in question, was planning to send Turkish troops to the Gulf, 
as he later was to make it clear.
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(8) Özal's position was the same when he threatened that Turkish airlines would 
be closed down if the strike went on much longer, blaming the demands o f the unions 
for the prolongation of the strike.
(9) He later shed more light on what he understood by the principle o f 
impartiality. He said 'My impartiality is in accordance with my oath. It is the principle 
of the impartiality of the state. My impartiality cannot mean that I no longer share the 
views o f a party which I had once founded and headed' (Cumhuriyet, 23 May 1990).
(9) Akbulut after losing the congress began to blame Özal of going back on his 
alleged promise o f support to him. He was only then to admit Özal's interventionism in 
affairs o f the party and government. He also claimed that Özal offered him a seat in the 
Yılmaz government, one which he refused to accept - an allegation that seems quite 
believable given Özal’s public statement that he backed the idea of a 'compromise 
cabinet' {Sabah, 3 March, 1992).
(11) Özal argued that the drastic increases were made at the expense o f the 
unemployed, and would lead to a three-digit inflation rate. Demirel again criticized 
Özal for creating friction among people ( Hürriyet, 9 January, 1991).
(12) Yılmaz in fact asked the press to distinguish between Özal and the ANAP, 
and banned for his ministers and bureaucrats to get in contact with the president {Sabah, 
17 September, 1991).
(13) The ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Reformist 
Democracy Party (IDP) entered the elections on the RP ticket for parliamentary 
representation, which, under the election law was impossible for parties with a 
following less than 10 percent.
64
(14) Under the 1982 Constitution, the president can be accused only o f treason 
by a decision of the three fourth o f the full membership o f the Assembly, upon the 
proposal of at least one-third o f that body (article 105). The amendment o f the 
Constitution, on the other hand, is a cumbersome procedure, itself having been 
amended in 1987. (Ozbudun, 1993:122-124) Finally, it may be added that a group o f 
constitutional lawyers argued that no constitutional amendment could suffice to depose 
the President because the 1989 president election earned him a droit acquis o f a term of 
office o f seven years, which cannot be taken back unless he is proved guilty o f treason 
by a court decision, and because there exists in law a general principle o f the non­
retroactivity o f laws, unless to the interest o f the accused.
(15) The proposed amendments only related to the manner o f the presidential 
election. The text outlined once again the well known reasons o f unseating Ozal, and 
argued that the situation o f the presidency made it more difficult for the country to 
solve other serious problems. It introduced a system o f direct popular election for the 
presidency, according to which the candidate obtaining at least half o f the votes in the 
first round or if  no single candidate could manage to do so in it, in the second round of 
the voting, now participated only by the two candidates obtaining the most votes in the 
original ballot, would replace Ozal as president. And, if Ozal himself liked, he would 
contest, too. As the SHP was already against such a method o f presidential election, the 
DYP offered an alternative draft, this time requiring a two-thirds or three-fifths o f the 
full membership of the assembly even in the third round of the voting in which only the 
two candidates performing best in the previous would be entitled to take part.
(16) Ozal said My era has come to an end. During the 1987 election campaign 
as the Premier of the time, I made some promises to the people. Therefore I had a moral 
responsibility to do the requirements o f those promises. We have just had the new
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elections. Now those who have obtained the popular mandate will rule. 1 will continue 
to express my opinions. But future governments may or may not take them into 
consideration' (Hürriyet, 30 October, 1991).
(17) Other examples may also be cited here. First, when Özal vetoed a 
government decree regarding the postponement o f local elections in some districts, 
Demirel made the comment that one had to accept that he used his presidential right, 
noting that the President was not a 'notary public'. Later, when Özal returned a law 
revising the procedure in penal law (the so called CUMK), the government took into 
account Özal's points of objection. On another occasion, Özal whole-heartedly lent 
support to Derairel's announcement that he (the latter) recognized the 'Kurdish reality' 
and that Turkey could stay idle at a time when the Iraqi government forced its people 
with a Kurdish origin to escape north to Turkey's borders to take refuge there.
(18) In the manner, he declared that the question was in fact no more that o f 
Nagorna-Karabagh but one o f Armenian aggression, that, if not stopped by the 
international community immediately, may grow to an extent whereby the Turkish 
government should consider intervening on behalf o f Azerbaijan after negotiating a 
mutual defense pact with that country (Cumhuriyet, 15 April, 1992) - a view criticized 
by the Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin as adventurism.
(19) Özal, among other things, lobbied for the solution o f the problem at a mass 
rally held to condemn the guilty of the humanity and once even suggested to the US 
administration a joint intervention (M illiyet, 30 January, 1993). Demirel's position in 
the event was that Turkey would move alongside the international community.
(20) Özal justified his talks by saying that it was normal for Turkey to be 
interested in the region, given the fact that the Kirkuk pipelines extend across the region
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{M illiyet, 12 October, 1992).
(21) Ozal reacted to this in two ways. He not only defended those bureaucrats 
who had served during his premiership and presidency but who were now accused o f 
corruption, but also employed them as presidential counselors and in the administrative 
branches of the presidency creating an appointed 'presidential cabinet', to use Demirel's 
words, or appointed them to higher courts in line with his appointive power. At the time 
of his death there were 23 presidential counselors.
(22) In fact the Court’s decision, which it took only several hours before Ozal's 
death, was in favor of Ozal’s arguments.
(23) By 'systemic transformation', I point to Ozal's urge and attempts to 
transform the system o f government in Turkey from parliamentarism to presidentialism.
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CHAPTER III
THE DEMIREL PRESIDENCY
3.1 Towards the 1993 Presidential Election
The sudden death o f Turgut Özal on 17 April 1993 brought the issue of 
succession to the fore for yet another time and soon began gossips as to who would and 
could become the next president. (1) For a while, attention was directed to the chances 
of Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the Speaker o f the Assembly, as a candidate in the upcoming 
presidential election. He had come to be regarded by the opposition as non-partisan and 
of equal distance to all parliamentary parties. The RP officials had even declared that 
they would back his presidential candidacy in case o f Özal's removal from office. 
Cindoruk's prospects for the presidency gradually disappeared, however, as the DYP 
leader Süleyman Demirel made clear his intention to bid for the office.
Demirel’s official declaration o f candidacy for the post resumed the debate on 
the method o f the election. For it was Demirel who had declared before Turgut Özal's 
election as president that the election had to be popular. When reminded o f his 
statement at the time, Derairel now replied 'The popular election of the president is my 
thesis. This opinion of mine has not changed. However it has no feasibility at the 
present [because] the presidency... cannot be left vacant for long'.
Also reminded to Demirel was his insistence on a qualified parliamentary 
majority as a condition of 'acceptance] by the majority o f the people' o f Özal's
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presidency. As this, too, was now not 'feasible', Demirel repeatedly stated that a simple 
majority was enough to elect a president.
Such a majority in Parliament was not at his disposal, however. The 
parliamentary seats were distributed among several parties, and the DYP commanded 
only 182 o f them. Such fragmentation, therefore, required some kind o f bargaining on 
the part o f the DYP with other parliamentary parties, and most notably with its coalition 
partner the SHP, which controlled 54 seats at the time. A possible unanimous or near- 
unanimous support o f the SHP deputies in the election was, in the final analysis, to 
suffice to elevate Demirel to the Presidential Palace.
The SHP leader, then, played his cards apparently for purposes o f bargaining. 
Given the SHP's perceived eagerness to continue in the coalition, Demirel, from the 
onset o f the election process, uttered statements that pleased that party. İnönü, however, 
pressed for directing the governmental action more along his own party’s priorities for a 
second 'coalition protocol' to be prepared by the two partners, if Demirel was to be 
elected president. To this end, he, for instance, used as a point o f leverage a decision 
taken by the party provincial chiefs not to support Demirel in the election, by stating 
that the decision was his 'party's opinion' (Milliyet, 30 April, 1993). As he took for 
granted what he sought, İnönü then stood surety for Demirel in the latter's promise for 
impartiality, by stating 'I am in no way worried about Demirel's statesmanship and 
[future] impartiality' {Sabah, 11 May, 1993). When, months after the election, in 
question asked, whether he was content with Demirel's presidency or not, he was to say 
that his party supported Demirel 'with pleasure' and had 'belief in him' {Sabah, 31 
October, 1993).
The attitude o f the opposition and the especially o f the main opposition party,
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the ANAP, as well as o f the SHP contributed to an uncontroversial election. The ANAP 
chairman made it clear that his party would not back Demirel in the election with votes, 
unless Demirel promised to call early general elections together with the local elections 
scheduled for March 1994 - a condition that looked unattractive to Demirel, but instead 
strive to find a candidate in consultation with other opposition parties (Sabah, 26 April, 
1993). As this proved to be impractical, however, the ANAP proposed its own 
candidate (Kamran İnan), and thus refrained from boycotting the election and unfolding 
a new legitimacy crisis. Yılmaz later declared that Demirel as the new president was no 
longer ANAP's political rival (Hürriyet, 18 May, 1993) and that he and his friends 
would respect him so long as Demirel abided by the constitution and remained 
impartial, 'in an attempt to prevent any damage to the office o f the presidency with day- 
to-day political quarrels' (Cumhuriyet, 19 May, 1993).
Other opposition parties, too, pursued similar lines. No party, therefore, 
boycotted the election. The RP and the Republican People's Party (CHP) proposed their 
own candidates (Lütfü. Doğan and Ismail Cem, respectively). In the end, on 16 May 
1993 Demirel was elected the ninth president of the Turkish Republic, and as the third 
in the office with a civilian background after his predecessor, by gamering 244 o f a 
possible total of 447 parliamentary votes. He took oath on the same day. To Demirel, 
his elevation to the post was a 'feast of democracy' (’demokrasi şöleni'),an apology to 
him for his 'unjust' removal from office (premiership) twice, in 1971 and 1980. As a 
columnist (Derya Sazak, M illiyet, 17 May, 1993) summarized the process the next day 
after the election:
A presidential election has passed without engendering a crisis 
as in the 1970s [and] 1980s. No debates have been made over 
returning to the fold of the people as in 1989 when Özal was 
elected. No widespread boycott has been evinced. The 
[military] has not aspired for the Presidential Palace.
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Everything has evolved along the lines o f civilianization. And 
the leader o f the party with the plurality o f parliamentary seats 
has been elected the president.
inonii's support has rendered impossible the non-Demirel 
formula. The DYP leader has been elected the ninth President, 
thanks to the lack o f [intra]-party divisions, and with the 
support o f the SHP and the MHP.
The 1993 presidential election, therefore, became one with no controversy, like 
the one in 1989, due mainly to conjunctural and conceptual reasons: conjuncturally 
neither controversial local general elections nor a subsequent opposition-government 
bickering about the legitimacy o f the Assembly and government and about presidential 
succession preceded the 1993 presidential election. Conceptually, on the other hand, 
now learning lessons from the 1989 election, the opposition remained loyal to rules o f 
the game, most notably by refraining from boycotting the election. The candidacy o f 
three other candidates from the opposition, who predictably had little or no chance for 
election, in fact, further legitimated Demirel's election.
3.2 Demirel as President
Demirel, in view o f the opposition to President Ozal's perceived partisanship, 
underlined the principle o f presidential impartiality before and after his assumption of 
the presidency during his oath-taking ceremony. He declared that he 'opened a new 
white notebook', instead o f the old one used for the day-to-day conduct o f political 
activity.
Demirel's understanding of impartiality rested on a distinction between politics 
and partyism, according to which he would remain non-partisan and neutral amid inter­
party debates on issues that belong to party politics (M illiyet, 17 May, 1993). In other 
words, Demirel stated that he would refrain from intervening in intra- and inter-party
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disputes. Corollary to this, Demirel would severe all his ’political’, but not 'human' 
relations with his party. This, in his distinction however was different from 
involvement in 'the grand matters o f Turkey’ like law and order, macroeconomics and 
the general framework o f foreign policy. On these matters, in fact, Demirel believed, 
there should be compromise between the political parties. To this end, he would play a 
'unifying' role in politics and society (M illiyet.; 25 April, 1993). Yet, as a 'referee', who 
was a 'party to the rules o f the game’, Demirel would intervene in the political process 
when and if the principles underlining the Turkish Constitution (constitution here being 
used in both senses, broader and narrower) were at stake; no player could continue in a 
game unless he kept to the rules {Sabah, 13 May, 1993).
This was in parallel with the meaning which Demirel attributed to the 
presidency. The understanding that guided Demirel's conduct as president was that the 
office was administrative as well as a political, entrusted with duties of ensuring the 
proper functioning o f the state and the application o f the constitution and the laws in 
accordance with the principle of the rule o f law, by coordinating the activities of the 
state organs, overseeing their proper and harmonious functioning, making the necessary 
recommendations, warnings and direction to them, protecting and defending the tenets 
underlining the state, attaining and maintaining stability, and resolving any possible 
crisis through messages o f confidence in the regime. As such, Demirel brought 'the state 
back in'. These duties Demirel was to perform as the head of the state, whose powers, 
according to Demirel, were wide enough to match those by the French President 
(Ertugrul Ôzkôk, 'Benim Mitterand Kadar Yetkim Var', Hiirriyet, 23 March 1993), and 
with the help o f his 'accumulation in and experience with politics' (M illiyet, 6 May, 
1993).
An upshot o f what Demirel termed 'constitutional presidency' to characterize his
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own, was active concern with matters of 'law and order' (i.e. 'national unity' and the 
'supremacy of law'), macroeconomics (e.g. inflation and balance-of-payments deficits), 
and foreign policy.
In addition to these, Demirel from the onset o f 1994 launched a gradual 
campaign o f  system ic revision, as part of his 'new interpretation' o f the presidency. In 
this connection, he, in an attempt to 'restructure the state’ in general, and the presidency 
in particular, had his 'council of counselors’ conduct research on the 'bottlenecks' o f the 
regime and publicized his research-directed views on many platforms. The ideas o f the 
minimalization of the state and the subsequent efficiency o f limited state functions 
within the spirit o f free market economics, o f the creation o f an 'open and free society', 
o f 'constitutional citizenship', and of the discussion o f Turkey’s macro-level problems 
are all examples of Demirel's urge to leave his imprint on the office - an urge which 
indicated that Demirel was aware of the problems of the system and strived for their 
solution.
Demirel's presidency never became controversial. His inception as president, as 
noted, did not lead to a legitimacy crisis. During his term so far, too, has he been 
criticized neither by the government, nor by the opposition or the press, except when he 
stated on a few occasions that he was the chief executive and as such entertained wide 
powers resembling those under the French semi-presidentialism (See, for instance, 
Ertugrul Ôzkôk, 'Benina Mitterand Kadar Yetkim Var', Hiirriyet, 23 March, 1994) .
Having elaborated Demirel's conception of the office, an attempt is made below 
to offer with concrete illustrations how that conception guided Demirel's high handed 
statist style.
Demirel and the DYP. Demirel made efforts to base his relations with the DYP
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on a balance. He felt morally responsible for its future, as evident in his statement 'I 
have so far thought, defended and preserved the unity o f the DYP as [its] leader... From 
now on too I desire the unity of the party and cannot allow anyone to [disunite it]’ 
{M illiyet, 6 May, 1993). Demirel, however, also declared (before his election as 
president) that he would not take the party uphill with himself {Cumhuriyet, 16 May, 
1993), and would accordingly treat it on equal terms with other political parties 
{Hürriyet 17 May, 1993); with the election in question he stated:’ the spiritual 
leadership for me came to an end' (ibid.). The most immediate legacy of Demirel to the 
party was coalition partnership and the duty to 'continue making good on what 
[Demirel] signed in the coalition protocol' {Cumhuriyet 16 May, 1993).
Demirel's first test in the matter o f impartially came with the DYP's 13 June 
Congress which would elect Demirel’s successor as chairperson. He received groups of 
party delegates. The candidates ( İsmet Sezgin, Mrs. Tansu Çiller and Koksal 
Toptan) all also visited the Presidential Palace to request his support. His response was 
apparently neutral (2); he noted that he did not have a candidate of his own choice and 
that he would appoint the victorious candidate as Premier. This he did for reasons o f 
stability in the party, as he had stated before the congress "According to the statute, I 
have the authority to appoint some [deputy] other than the one who would emerge 
[victorious] from the congress. But I will not use this authority because [then] the party 
would become divided'. He had also opposed the idea that the Premier and the party 
chairperson be different people apparently on the same grounds {Hürriyet 17 May, 
1993). In the end, Tansu Çiller was elected the DYP's new chairperson and soon 
assumed the prime ministry.
Demirel's contacts with the party officials continued throughout his presidency. 
He made comments on the party 'as an expert and not as the president'. He portrayed his
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relations with the party officials as 'human' and 'apolitical'. In the manner he stated
I have been involved in this political movement for thirty years.
The people who [have been in touch with] me are my friends.
If one of them wants to speak to me, I cannot say 'Don't come... 
[otherwise] you damage my impartially'. This is a father-child 
[relationship]... What I mean by saying I am the father o f this 
family is in a human sense (MiUiyet, 19 November, 1993).
As an 'expert,' Demirel also extended his recommendations to the party deputies 
and delegates. This he did for reasons o f stability in the party; such stability, Demirel 
argued, was compulsory for stability in the country at large. This was the case mainly 
on the eve o f the congress scheduled for November 1993. During his meeting with the 
two competitors of Çiller in the preceding congress, Demirel said:
...[Any] instability in the DYP would scatter to Turkey [at 
large]. Do not divide [the party and] do not let [anyone] 
divide [it]. Keep the party's dignity [and] honor. Harsh 
[conditions] await Turkey. The DYP is necessary for Turkey.
The country's problem [can] be solved through [national] unity.
The DYP is an element of stability. Do endeavor not to damage 
stability {M illiyet, 16 November, 1993).
Demirel, when asked whether the upcoming congress concerned him, gave a 
similar answer.
There are eleven political parties in the Assembly. The Turkish 
politics cannot tolerate new division... The matter concerns me 
in this sense, that is for stability reasons... It is... above-politics 
to ask for the protection of the state [and] democracy, and this 
is requisite o f my duty (M M iyet, 19 November, 1993).
Demirel's criticism of the party policies came only after the 27 May 1994 local 
elections. These at the first glance looked like simple criticisms o f the party’s election 
campaign. They were, however, directed towards the leader's departure from the 
classical line of the party. In an interview for instance he pointed out:
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If you are... in power, then you will tell o f 'your own 
achievements'. Do not you have any [accomplishments]? Many 
have been done since 1991, do market them. The DYP issue[d] 
ads [in newspapers] about Yilmaz's failures [in government] 
instead of telling o f its success... Another mistake also is 
discernible in this affair. That his failures cannot become a 
matter of [criticism], given that he is not in power [currently]... 
The DYP... criticized Özal for eight years... Now the DYP's 
chairperson resort to Özal's statements [against Yılmaz] so as to 
increase its vote in the local election. This is wrong... Such a 
policy hurts those who voted for the DYP in 1991. (Yavuz 
Donat, 'Süleyman Bey'in "Yazılmamak Kaydıyla" Anlattıkları', 
, M illiyet, 10 April, 1993)
Demirel and the Opposition. The president's relation with the opposition parties 
and, with the ANAP in particular, became collaborative, thanks to the constructive and 
principled attitude o f the opposition toward Demirel since his election, and due to 
Demirel's resolution not to engage in politics on a day-to-day basis. This relationship 
became stable as the president initiated a series of meetings with the opposition party 
leaders, later becoming periodical (three-monthly). In the meetings, Demirel discussed 
Turkey's macro-level problems with them, informed them o f developments (sometimes 
extending information o f vital significance), and proposed them his long-term, macro­
level solutions. In this context could one see Demirel's advice to the opposition to unite 
so as to amend the Standing Order of the Assembly and the Constitution, and to initiate 
judicial and administrative reforms for the better functioning of the state (M i/liyet, 10 
December, 1993).
Demirel also played a go-between role in the government-opposition relations. 
When, for instance, the opposition leaders complained to him about the government's 
inability to manage the economy and requested him to intervene by taking initiative 
under article 119 of the Constitution which deals with the state of emergency in cases of 
serious economic crisis , he stated that he would extend their views and anxiety to the
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government; meet the Council o f Ministers , if he deemed necessary; and requested 
them to assist the government for the best interests o f the country, and to debate the 
government's weaknesses and failures in the Assembly, rather than with him (Hiirriyet; 
5/6 May, 1994).
At least by the time o f writing this work, Demirel’s relations with the opposition 
rested on an understanding which can be summarized in his words as follows:' I am 
pleased with the meeting with the [opposition] party leaders. If [they] want to say 
anything, [they] should be able to. And they must be sure that what they say will be 
taken seriously’ (Hiirriyet.; 5 May, 1994).
D emirel and the Council o f  M inisters (Government). Before his election to the 
office, Demirel had promised that he would not block the government's functioning 
and, had stated in this connection that he would be helpful to it in case of a possible 
constitutional amendment ( Cumhuriyet, 16 May, 1993).
Not long after he climbed to the presidency, Demirel set up a 'council o f 
counselors', its membership not exceeding ten people, and its duty being 'producing 
ideas in such matters as defense, foreign policy, economy [and] education in a way to 
take Turkey to brilliant prospects'. The '[council] would not be preoccupied with the 
affairs o f the government or of this or that [official]'. Aided by that council; Demirel 
would 'tell the government what was necessary' (M illiyet, 6 July, 1993).
Such a think tank was later actually created, thanks to President Ozal's 
institutionalization o f  presidential counselorship. The new counselors, replacing those 
of Ôzal (3), were recruited from among Demirel's cadre in the bureaucracy, including 
those dismissed by the new Premier.
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The first instance o f testable relations between the presidency and the 
government came with the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's official visit to Ankara. 
Demirel's admission o f Kohl was also attended by the acting Premier Erdal İnönü, 
although the president was not obliged by protocol to invite him to that meeting 
(M illiyet, 22 May, 1993). Such a behavior is understandable , given Demirel's already 
well-established conduct of foreign affairs, i.e. seeking to proceed in harmony with the 
government and the bureaucracy (the foreign service, for that matter). The occurrence, 
therefore, had little to offer predictability in this respect.
Then came the question of whether Demirel would approve the new Council o f 
Ministers without any objection or would request the new Prime Minister to offer him 
alternative names for one or more ministries. When asked o f the issue, Demirel replied 
that he would neither comment nor advise on the matter before seeing the list, adding 
that was in his discretion to refuse to appoint anyone into the Council (Hürriyet, 25 
June, 1993). When the list was actually presented to him, however, he approved it 
without any known opposition. Meanwhile, he also warned that the government could 
not be successful unless it worked in harmony with the presidency (Yavuz Donat, 
'Cumhurbaba'mn Penceresi'nden', M illiyet, 27 June, 1993).
The new Prime Minister talked o f 'opening a white page' just after her 
assumption o f the post. The message implied that the Demirel government did not leave 
a bright legacy. She was, in fact, quick in stating this expressly, noting that the current, 
neglected, ailing economy required prompt treatment. Demirel immediately reacted by 
defending and praising his period in government and, by contending:
I am ready to discuss the '500 days' [the period which Demirel 
had foreseen was enough for his government to mend the 
economy] with whoever wishes to discuss it... [Do] not try to 
explain today's problems [and] disturbances in terms of the past
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or o f the future. [Do] find solutions. It is said that the economy 
badly falters because the [necessary] measures were not adopted 
two year ago. This is nonsense. You [read, Tansu Çiller] are in 
government for the [last] eight months. Then... why did you not 
do so? (M illiyet, 17, May, 1994)
Demirel later also argued that his period o f government was without question 
better than that o f Çiller (M illiyet, 6 May, 1994). (4)
Demirel explained his confrontation with the Prime Minister as a matter o f  self- 
defense:' I have a political background. If [it] is debated, then I defend myself. That I 
am a president does not do away with my defense right' (M illiyet, 14 May, 1994).
Demirel's second major reaction was towards Çiller's attempt to install her own 
network in the bureaucracy. She, as noted, dismissed some bureaucrats, and Demirel, 
feeling morally responsible , employed them as presidential counselors. The Prime 
Minister, then, sought to recruit people, with less than a twelve-year minimum required 
period o f service in the bureaucracy, to higher positions, including those in the 
Organization o f the Prime Ministry, and the posts o f undersecretary and their deputies 
and general directorates in the State Planning Organization (D evlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 
DPT), and the Undersecretariat o f Treasury and Foreign Trade (Hazine ve D ış Ticaret 
Müsteşarlığı, HDTM). Demirel vetoed a Council o f Ministers decree, which included 
these posts in the area o f 'exceptional civil service' ('istisnai memuriyet). Demirel's 
justification in this regard was that the positions in question were those which entailed 
considerable responsibility and, that the decree would pave the way for 'arbitrariness' in 
appointments to the 'higher echelons of the state,’ which, he noted, he should prevent 
according to the constitution, the laws and the custom (M illiyet, 23 July, 1993).
Çiller responded to Demirel's reaction rather smoothly. She said that she would 
resolve the problem by consulting the president, who, in her opinion, objected to
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'details', noting, however, that the present conditions o f a twelve-year bureaucratic 
service hindered the opportunities of the 'able' (ibid.).
The occurrence was followed by Çiller's conciliatory statements and Demirel's 
warnings concerning the nature o f his expectations in his relations with the government. 
Çiller spoke of benefiting from her predecessor's long-accumulated knowledge and 
experience, o f working in harmony with the President, and o f refraining from creating 
from troubles ('fight') 'at the zenith o f the state* (See, for instance, Sabah, 5 August, 
1993).
Demirel, on the other hand, warned that the government must request his views 
and advices about 'grand matters', that he would not keep silent towards 'fa it acco m p li 
in those matters (Hürriyet, 12 August, 1993). This 'warning and direction', according to 
Demirel, was different from 'meddling' because o f two discernible reasons. First, 
Demirel felt that it was his duty to aid the government at his best for its success because 
failure in this respect would not be to the country's benefit (ibid). The second reason, in 
the words o f Demirel, is:
This government did not emerge from the 13 June congress, but 
from the 1991 elections. The., congress only elected the [new] 
party chairperson. The [DYP] had engaged in commitments 
[before the elections]. Whoever comes to the headship] o f the 
party, s/he cannot quit them. [One] may [categorize] as the first 
and second [Council of Ministers], but not as the first and 
second governments (H iiniyet, 19 October, 1993).
Not too long afterwards, Demirel again reacted when Çiller unfolded her rather 
imaginary plan to providing some 400 thousand lycee graduates with the opportunity to 
receive university education and, her alleged attempt to create what was publicly called
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the ’private [read, anti-guerrilla-vvarfare] army'. Demirel opposed both in a subtle way 
(not to let the matter create an impression of an open intra-executive infight) on 
practical and constitutional grounds, respectively (M illiyet, 14 August, 1993). It was 
Çiller who was to retreat afterwards .
As for the issue o f the approval o f government-initiated legislations, Demirel 
maintained Özal's way o f warning about what might amount to a possible veto before 
any legislation actually appeared before him. Demirel, however, also introduced, a 
novelty, a m idway practice o f attaching to his approval the points o f warning about 
what should be given priority considerations to during the implementation o f such 
legislations. A case in point is that o f the law o f taxation (M illiyet, 31 December, 
1993). When the concerned bill was discussed in Parliament, he stated that the criterion 
had to be 'none from the economically weak and in a way proportional to wealth from 
the rest' (M illiyet, 19 December, 1993), sent a letter to the Speaker, the Prime Minister 
and her deputy, in which he warned that he might veto the prospective law if they failed 
either to correct the technical deficiencies or to pay attention to the public opinion and 
the views o f the professional organizations (M illiyet, 24 December, 1993). When the 
law appeared before him, Demirel approved it, while at the same time he gave his 
'advices' concerning the applications o f the law, keeping his right o f veto reserved for 
the Council o f Ministers decrees to be issued in accordance with the law.
A major reason o f the occasional disagreements between the President and the 
Prime Minister was the difference in their conceptions o f democracy and politics. 
Çiller, not unlike Demirel when he was the Prime Minister in 1991, sought to give 
responsiveness a priority consideration, whereas Demirel underlined responsible 
behavior. Another reason was the lack o f proper communication between the two 
heads. Both found out about the views o f one another on some issues from the media.
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As observed by a columnist (Altan Öymen, 'Bir Bardak Suda...', Milliyet, 15 August, 
1993),
...[the president and the prime minister] learn views o f one 
another from the press, [a]nd sometimes only partially... They 
may make exaggerated comments relying on [paper 
headlines]... The 'private army' issue is an example. It is 
controversial whether the term belongs to Çiller or to those who 
summarized what she said. The prime minister's spokesman 
says:' No, the prime minister did not use such a term...'. Our 
friends who attended [her] travel to the southeast [Anatolia] 
however say she used it. No matter if  she used it or not...
Concretely what does the prime minister want to do?... [One 
may] see it in the two government decrees published and... 
signed by the president on 12 August...[These have nothing to 
do with the allegations].
In almost a year's time, Demirel presided over the Council of Ministers only 
once, and over the National Security Council twelve times. He received the Speaker o f 
the Assembly nineteen times, the Prime Minister (and her deputy) thirty-five times, the 
Chief o f the General Staff thirty-three times. As for the approval of decrees, Demirel 
finalized 7.2 transactions per day.(5)
Demirel's Areas o f  Particular Concern. Law and order, the economy and foreign 
affairs were the three areas o f the concentration for the new President, too, although his 
approaches to all them differed from his predecessor. Demirel saw these areas first and 
foremost as matters in the domain of the state rather than in that o f politics. He 
advocated the maintenance of the status quo in them, with change only possible for 
purpose o f revising the disfunctioning and malfunctioning parts of the system rather 
than o f transforming it as a whole. (This will be taken up below in greater detail)
In the first area, he defended the supremacy o f law and the maintenance o f 
public order. He evaluated virtually all developments in terms o f their impact on the
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stability o f the regime. Debate on national issues was acceptable, Demirel held, so long 
as it did not prejudice stability and damage the system; if anything is legal but unjust, 
then the practice rather than the institution should be criticized. Therefore, the failures 
and deficiencies o f the regime, and not the regime itself should be debated and 
removed. This was, in fact, necessary because the 'proper functioning o f the state is a 
sine qua non for the regime not to become a matter of discussion'. It was this 
understanding of Demirel which led him to intervene in matters o f these three areas to 
the extent they, in his perception, had an impact on the regime. Put differently, 
Demirel's main concern has been the preservation o f the regime; he, to this end, placed 
special emphasis on law and order; and intervened in the economy and foreign affairs 
with a statesman's mentality in an attempt to refresh and sustain popular belief in the 
state and to obtain the support of the people, the Parliament, the political parties, and 
the media.
Having drawn a general framework within which to evaluate Demirel's areas o f 
special interest, an attempt is here made to distinguish his role in these three areas for 
analytical purposes.
D em irel and Law  and Order. Demirel's priority in this regard was separatist 
terrorism - the most imminent, but also the most serious problem that faced the country. 
This, in his opinion, was a national issues that lay in the domain o f the state, and hence 
in his jurisdiction as its head (Hiirriyet, 19 October, 1993). His headship o f the National 
Security Council and chairmanship o f the Council o f Ministers at times o f state o f 
emergence, according to Demirel, justified his argument (Nokta, 16 May, 1993). Thus 
thinking, Demirel controlled and oversaw the implementation of the state policy, by 
manipulating the public opinion and the press; by resolving anxieties that the problem 
continually created; by overseeing military operations in the areas where terroristic
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activities flourished (most notably in southern Anatolia); and by striving to influence 
the world public opinion in the face o f alleged violations of human rights by writing 
letters to foreign leaders to explain Turkey's arguments in this regard. It was Demirel, 
and not the government, who declared that an amnesty was impossible before the terror 
issue was resolved (M illiyet; 22 December, 1993). The fact that he met with the Chief 
o f the General Staff thirty three times in a year's time indeed denotes and proves his 
consideration o f the matter as a top priority.
Demirel's approach to the problem was predominantly unidimensional. When 
the Prime Minister declared that she would seek parliamentary consensus by meeting 
with party chiefs, he declared that parliamentary support was important and already 
existent, but not productive; the matter, Demirel believed, was, on the whole, one o f 
terrorism and only one solution, the preseat one, existed (Yavuz Donat, 'Çankaya'da 
Konuşulan "Tek Yol", M illiyet, 12 August, 1993). Doing this, however, he added, the 
people in the southeast region should be treated 'with affection' and the state organs 
should keep to the rule of law (Yavuz Donat, 'Çankaya Herkesi Soğukkanlı Olmaya 
Çağırıyor', M illiyet, 27 July, 1993). The economic reconstruction of that region would 
only follow that solution.
Demirel clearly distinguished the issue from Kurdish identity {Hürriyet, 11 
August, 1993). It was during his Premiership that he had first talked of that identity. 
Such recognition, as part o f what he later termed 'constitutional citizenship’, however 
was limited to allowing people with a Kurdish origin to say so {Cumhuriyet, 25 March, 
1994). From that confine on, Demirel believed, 'it [was] necessary to look at the impact 
o f what is demanded on the indivisible unity o f Turkey' {Hürriyet, 22 December, 1993). 
He felt Kurdish broadcasting and education would prejudice such unity and, hence 
could not be discussed; such practices, if adopted, would mean to be concessions to
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terrorism that, Demirel argued, would have a doubling effect because the separatist 
groups would come to conclude that concessions were possible only when they 
continued on course {Sabah, 25 July, 1993).
Another case o f law and order in which Demirel played a smoothing role was 
that o f the 27 March 1993 local elections. As the pro-Islamic RP emerged victorious in 
the elections, winning many provincial mayoralties, the press and the intelligentsia 
began debating on whether the Islamic movement in Turkey had any prospects to 
challenge the secular state - leading to a considerable degree o f anxiety on behalf o f the 
secularist sectors o f the society. In the event, Demirel intervened stating 'Turkey is a 
country o f rules. The [election] results shall be endured if the rule is adopted... Right 
exists [with] responsibility. The freedom o f religion and conscience the human rights, 
[and] the secular republic make up Turkey's framework. Disloyalty to this means to 
threat the [system] of the state' {M illiyet, 3 April, 1994).
Demirel, through this statement, gave a double message. The first was that the 
political party in question was intra-systemic and hence system-bound, and that it was 
equal before law as others so long as it remained loyal and responsible to the Turkish 
political system. When later the RP leader Necmettin Erbakan spoke o f transition to his 
party’s rule either in bloodshed or in peace (to be decided by the people, Erbakan put), 
Demirel reacted vehemently and warned not to politicize education and worship.
Demirel and the Economy. Demirel oversaw the economic process with 
specialists aiding him in identifying the reasons o f major economic problems and 
seeking their solutions. He over time underlined the necessity to install the free market 
economic system as a whole, and suggested the creation o f an open regime and open 
society in full as a panacea, ie. as a proper ground for the functioning of that system,
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Inflation, privatization, development, and the renewing and widening of the industrial 
and economic infrastructure were issues that he mentioned the most.
He made warnings, suggestions, analysis and comments on the economy mostly 
on the macro-level. His concern with the economy stemmed not only from his 
experience with it in office as Premier for several times, but also from his foresight that 
any serious trouble in the economy would naturally lead to political repercussions, 
including 'disbelief in the regime' {M illiyet, 6 May, 1994).
His attitude during disturbances that began in January 1994 is illustrative in this 
connection. His diagnosis was that the disturbances in the fiscal sector resulted from the 
monetary (foreign currency) fluctuations, but was mainly psychological in the sense 
that the Turkish Lira lost its confidence and attraction. He suggested that the necessary 
measures had to be immediately adopted by the government in order to prevent a drift 
into an economic crisis, which would also lead to social and, finally, political 
disturbances, ultimately benefiting the anti-systemic movements (ibid.). The opposition, 
Demirel maintained, should support the government in the process for the best interests 
o f the country (Hiirriyet, 6 May, 1994). The measures, to Demirel, in the longer term 
had to include privatization, the legislation o f a new law of taxation, and the resumption 
o f the attractiveness o f the lira . Doing this, furthermore, the government had to do its 
best not to hurt the people, to distribute to them the burden on an equal basis, and most 
essentially not to continue giving alarming messages (Fikret Bila, 'Demirel'in 
Diyemedikleri', M illiyet, 3 April, 1994). In this juncture, Demirel received suggestions 
from the business sector and some political parties to intervene in the economy under 
article 119. Demirel declined the suggestions holding that such an intervention, albeit 
constitutional, was impossible as long as the coalition government continued (M illiyet, 
11 April, 1994).
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On the whole, therefore, Demirel refrained from attempting to conduct the 
economy, and instead left it to the Prime Minister, who was by occupation a professor 
of economics.
Demirel and Foreign Policy. As stated above, Demirel always did his utmost in 
building harmonious relations between the presidency, the government, and the foreign 
service. With this area, too, did he concern himself to the extent it was necessary for 
purposes o f law and order. At the time of writing this section, virtually all relevant 
instances indicated that he administered the classical policy line in the Turkish foreign 
service. He became preoccupied with the issues o f Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Armenian onslaught on Azerbaijan, northern Iraq and Somalia to the extent o f the 
relative influence o f each on Turkey. As stated above, Demirel also explained abroad 
Turkey’s position and policies vis-à-vis the terroristic activities in the southeast 
Anatolia.
When a civilian coup d'état (leadership struggle) was staged in Azerbaijan and a 
subsequent referendum was held as to determine the new leadership, Demirel appeared 
in the picture conducting telephone diplomacy (6) with the parties concerned but also 
stating that Turkey would abide by the referendum result, for the contrary would mean 
an interference with the internal affairs of that country (M illiyet, 31 August, 1993).
Secondly, when the Armenian onslaught on Azerbaijan reached a critical point 
and much debate was made in Turkey whether that country would and should intervene 
on behalf o f the latter if  it officially demanded so, Demirel ruled that Turkey had done 
everything it could except military intervention, that such an intervention is not in the 
'national interests' o f the country. He added that any demand for it did not 
automatically entail Turkey's engagement in such an action; Turkey could move,
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Demirel stated, only in accordance with a United Nations decision (ibid.).
A final prominent case in which to find the classical lines o f Turkish foreign 
policy in Demirel was that he declared 'artificial' the debate on the modification o f the 
Montreux Treaty (which deals with the regime in the Turkish Straits) on the basis o f 
the principle of rebus sic stantibus (radical changes in conditions that prevailed at the 
time o f the conclusion o f an agreement) (Hiirriyet, 11 August, 1993).
3.3 Intra-Systemic Revision
'Let us seek panacea in the system' is a good summary o f Demirel's conception 
o f politics. Such an approach implies the existence o f somethings going wrong, as well 
as of others going on way. Demirel put it in a concrete manner:
There exist deficiencies in Turkey. [But] there also exist good 
things [there]. I want to insert both into the minds of the 
Turkish people'. The most crucial of the good things, was a 
well-established democratic system, in which the citizens 
should have faith. 'However, [the] state should in return take 
every measure to consolidate such faith. It is because o f this 
that the time has come again, for reform, that is, for putting 
ourselves in an order (Yavuz Donat, 'Süleyman Bey Ne 
Yapmak İstiyor?', M illiyet, 18 January, 1994).
The 'free, democratic, grand Turkey' was the central target Demirel set. To 
accomplish this, he felt and argued, there was a need for intra-systemic revision, failure 
to effect which would feed extra - and/or anti-systemic orientations, transformations, 
and deviations; everything but not the system itself, therefore, could and should be 
debated, in an attempt to restnicture the state, the society, and in particular the 
presidency. Democratic stability, which, inferred from what Demirel said about it,
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means the maintenance of the status quo with continual and incremental change so as 
not to resort to shock therapy, was essential.
In the manner, Demirel had surveys conducted and proposed reforms based on 
their results. They included reform in Parliament (amendments in the Standing Order in 
an attempt to rebuild popular faith in the Assembly by increasing the efficiency o f the 
check mechanism and by ensuring popular checking through television broadcasting), 
in the judiciary (facilitating the process), in administration (decentralization), in the 
economy (renewing and widening of the infrastructure), and in health and education 
services.
Besides, Demirel also sought to restructure the office o f the presidency again on 
the basis o f such surveys. The result was transforming it into one that is quite easily 
accessible by the people: In a year's time, Demirel received 10850 people and 27266 
petitions concerning various complaints, demands and notices, all having been 
evaluated by the end o f that period.
Most evidently, however, Demirel emerged as politician-tumed-statesman after 
16 May 1993. In the process, he declared that the Turkish system was semi-presidential, 
and that as a senw-president, so as to say, he would press for systemic revision, 
including a new understanding o f the history, and a synthetic formulation o f Islam, its 
prominent sects in Turkey, nationalism, ethnicity, democracy and republic (Ertugrul 
Ôzkôk, 'Benim Mitterand Kadar Yetkim Var', Hiirriyet, 23 March, 1994).
The ultimate target in Demirel's mind was: 'There must be a great democratic 
Turkey at the turn of the 20th century'. Demirel put forth his 'personal' views, which, if 
effected, he held, would take the country to that target.
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NOTES
(1) This chapter largely draws upon a survey o f M illiyet; from 18 April 1993 to 
31 May 1994.
(2) Few months after the congress, Demirel declared that he could have his own 
choice elected and, that he refrained from doing so because 'such an attitude would 
contradict both his position and political honesty' (.Hürriyet, 11-13 August, 1993).
(3) Most o f Özal's counselors either resigned or were dismissed.
(4) Another instance o f Demirel's defense o f his background was over the so 
called 24 January 1980 measures. When, in a largely attended meeting, Çiller spoke o f 
the negative impacts o f the measures on the employed sector, Demirel, another 
addresser in the meeting, advocated them and openly challenged the Premier ( M illiyet, 
25 January, 1994). Çiller declared the next day that her statement was misunderstood 
(Taha Akyol, 'Demirel ve Çiller', M illiyet, 26 January, 1994).
(5) The first year's account of approvals and disapprovals of legislations by 
Demirel are as follows:
S u b m itted  
for ap p ro v a l
A p p ro v ed R etu rn ed
(v e to e d )
W ith d raw n P e n d in g
L a w s 7 9 7 6 2 - 1
D e c r e e s  h a v in g  fo r ce  o f  la w 4 2 3 7 - t t
C o u n c il  o f  M in is te r s  d e c r e e s  (d e c is io n s ) 1045 1 0 4 0 4 i -
Jo in t a p p o in t iv e  d e c r e e s 1 0 3 2 1283 3 6 2 1
M em o r en d a 171 171
t  The total is 5.
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Adapted from CumhurbaskanUgi (1994).
(6) Demirel, in a year's time, made 61 telephone calls and admitted 52 
ambassadors.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY IN TURGUT OZAL AND 
SULEYMAN DEMIREL: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
What differences and similarities are discernible between Ozal's conception o f 
the presidential office and that o f Demirel, and what factors shape their conception? 
The answers to these questions are deduced below from an analysis o f what has so far 
been mentioned about these presidencies. The central thesis here is that the main factor 
that underlined the differences is the broader conceptions o f politics and in the ultimate 
targets desired to reach, while the similarities mainly emanated from the similarity in 
political background, both elevating to the office as politicians with a civilian 
background and as center-right wing party leaders with either a majority or a plurality 
o f the seats in Parliament.
The road to Ozal's presidency was rather painful, leading eventually to a legality 
versus legitimacy debate between the ruling ANAP government and the opposition, 
intra- or extra-parliamentary. That the ANAP gradually lost ground in society since 
1987 (especially in the 1989 local elections) and that the period of polemics as to who 
would become the next president among other factors contributed to that debate.
By contrast, the sudden death o f Ozal and the still intact social support behind 
the DYP prevented the recurrence of the debate in question in 1993. The attitude of the 
opposition parties, which might easily be called loyal opposition and the optim ally 
fragmented composition o f the parliament were also the advantages which Demirel
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entertained, because earlier in 1989 the opposition’s policy o f non-recognition o f the 
Ôzal presidency (i.e. boycotting his election and presidential protocol ceremonies; the 
formula o f resignations en mass; and the salvos o f removing Ôzal and calling him to 
account) had made Ôzal more stubborn in his non-constitutional moves.
In respect o f impartiality, Ozal's record was constitutionally not so brilliant. He 
did not allow the delegates to use their free will in determining the new Premier whom 
he nominated as his successor as chairman and lobbied on the latter's behalf. He 
initiated the naming o f the ministers in the Akbulut cabinet. His contacts with the 
ANAP deputies and delegates continued until his real departure from that party in 1992. 
It was again Ôzal who, before the ANAP congress leading to that departure, had 
nominated another candidate against Mesut Yilmaz.
Such domination o f the party, according to Ôzal, did not breach the principle o f 
the presidential impartiality, because he defined that principle as a mere formality 
meaning little more than the inability to participate in party affairs with a voting right. 
The fact that the opposition almost always criticized Ozal's moves because they were so 
seems to have contributed to that tendency o f him. Ôzal's stance is understandable, not 
in terms o f the Constitution, but only recalling that he voiced everything what he 
thought was true, without any consideration of the requirements o f the presidency. As 
observed by a columnist (Fatih Çekirge, 'Detnirel’e Çankaya Raporu’, Sabah, 12 May, 
1993), 'his partisanship meant being a party to the truth in which he believed. 
Otherwise he would not have contradicted the ANAP, which we had come to regard as 
his "team". Therefore he was not an "ANAP partisan".'
Having already pointed out that the powers o f the presidency were sufficient not 
to seek new ones, Demirel, by contrast was short of actively intervening in neither the
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congress (by appointing the new Premier in advance and nominating him as his own 
candidate) nor in naming the new ministers. He maintained his relations with the party 
officials for human and stability reasons, that is, as a father and as an expert, 
respectively.
The nature o f the relations o f Ozal, on the other hand, and o f Demirel, on the 
other, with the opposition also differed. The conjuncture and the opposition's 
understanding of opposition were the variables that determined the nature o f such 
relationships (the point is made in detail in chapter three).
The degree o f independence o f a government from the presidency in the 
exercise o f powers bestowed upon the Council o f Ministers alone or jointly with the 
presidency was the major factor that affected the extent to which Ozal influenced and 
initiated governmental action. (1) During Akbulut's premiership Ozal managed to 
divide and the rule economy, and to initiate macro-level national security and foreign 
policies, paving the way for a blurring in the lines o f responsibility. During the 
independent-minded Yilmaz's period, however, Ozal was relegated to a relatively 
traditional role on party issues and matters in the government's jurisdiction. Finally, as 
the DYP-SHP coalition government resulted from the 1991 elections, Ozal had to take a 
back seat, now only expressing his views as warning an advice (but not initiating 
policies) and vetoing legislations when they were overlooked.
Demirel by contrast involved in government's polities in an attempt to 
coordinate them with the state organs (most notably the National Security Council and 
the Assembly) and to oversee their implementation. His intervention in the executive 
functions was confined to where and from the point the state appeared in the picture. He 
warned and advised the government on the central issues o f the country in a way similar
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to the way Ozal did when he was the Prime Minister, but his warnings and advices were 
neither as frequent nor as pervasive as those of Ozal. Ozal had extended them in a 
manner to guide things with his own hands, whereas Demirel presented his views as 
personal except in cases in which the issue lay within the general framework o f the 
regime. (2)
Differences within similarities also exist in how they justified their ways. Both 
stressed that they came out of politics, were morally responsible to their parties (and 
hence met and advised party officials), had long-accumulated knowledge and 
experience to use when directing warnings and advices to the government and the 
Assembly, and were o f the opinion that the 1982 Constitution created a stronger 
presidency compared to the preceding one, making references to the 1958 French 
Constitution. The difference between Ozal and Demirel was rather in the 
implementation o f their above-stated similarities. The former reasoning as such 
endeavored to usurp the government's prerogatives even where the government had 
normally to decide alone. This was mainly the case during the premiership o f the weak 
Akbulut.
Demirel, by contrast, limited himself to warning and advising the government in 
most politically centered matters.
A fliture point o f legitimation Ozal stated to explain his interventionism was the 
Kenan Evren's Presidency. Ozal held that Evren's presidency was stronger and more 
interventionist than his own. The argument had some merit. As Ozbudun (1988: 4) put 
it,
[t]he... authority and influence o f President Evren [was] due to 
two exceptional circumstances. One is that he is the leader o f 
the 1980 military intervention and, in this sense, the chief
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architect o f the 1982 Constitution. The other is that he is 
popularly elected by direct universal suffrage on the basis [a] 
provisional article of the Constitution..., by an immense 
majority (92 percent).
Evren had his impact felt until he left office. When, few months before leaving 
the presidency a minister complained about his outspoken behavior, he reacted by 
saying 'Some [ministers] become bothered by [my] speeches; they want that [1] just 
take a back seat in the Palace and sign whatever is placed before [me]'.
It is equally evident however that Evren took a compromising attitude towards 
the government, gradually leaving to the government some o f the duties which he 
himself had performed (Heper, 1990:309-316).
Back to the comparison, the most significant factor that determined the 
differences between the two presidents in their conceptions o f the office is the ultimate 
target they desired to reach as expounded above in detail: Ôzal attempted to use every 
channel besides the presidency, the Assembly, the government, the ANAP etc. -no 
matter what their constitutional positions were vis-à-vis the presidency, for purposes of 
effecting a systemic transformation, because the parliamentary system o f government, 
inconvenient for Turkey for a number o f reasons, produces instability.
Demirel by contrast, admitted that there exist problems in the regime, but 
believed that every problem could be resolved through a firm belief in it.
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NOTES
( 1 )  1 say 'influenced and initiated' because Ozal continually publicized his view, 
and what changed was the level of adherence to those view by the successive 
governments of Akbulut, Yilmaz and Demirel.
(2) It may be argued on the basis of the hypothesis concerning the nature o f the 
relations between the President and the Council o f Ministers in the semi-presidential 
system [(and also the Assembly), see chapter one] that Ozal's hand was strong during 
the Akbulut government because there was a one-party majority in Parliament, because 
the President was the former member and de facto leader of that majority party; that his 
influence was weakened during the Yilmaz government, because the Premier gradually 
became the real leader o f the ANAP; and finally that when the DYP-SHP government 
came into power he was relegated to becoming a still less influential figure in the 
political process, only benefiting from the relative fragmentation of the parliamentary 
seats among several political parties. That Demirel actually ceased to lead the DYP 
after his election as president, and that there was a coalition, rather than a one-party 
majority government, contributed to stop that President's search for an active role in the 
executive functions o f a predominantly political nature.
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